STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M. BONHAM; BOYD F. SUMMERHAYS and ARLEEN M. SUMMERHAYS v. ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State Engineer; SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Utah and a body corporate; and DRAPER IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah corporation : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M.
BONHAM; BOYD F. SUMMERHAYS and
ARLEEN M. SUMMERHAYS v. ROBERT L.
MORGAN, Utah State Engineer; SALT LAKE
COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of
Utah and a body corporate; and DRAPER
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah corporation :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Michael M. Quealy; John H. Mabey, JR.; Attorneys for Defendents-
Respondent, Utah State Engineer;
James A. McIntosh; attorneys for plaintiffs-appellants.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bonham v. Morgan, No. 880143.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2085
DOCUMENT 
KF • BRIEF 
45.9 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M. 
BONHAM; BOYD F. SUMMERHAYS and 
ARLEEN M. SUMMERHAYS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
•ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State Engi-
neer; SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CON-
SERVANCY DISTRICT, a political sub-
division of the State of Utah and a 
body corporate; and DRAPER IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
•ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State 
Engineer, is the only Defendant-
Respondent to this Appeal. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
ON APPEAL FROM RULE 54(b) FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MICHAEL M. QUEALY 
JOHN H. MABEY, JR. 
Assistant Attorneys General 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
Intrade Building South #14 
1399 South 700 East 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS 
Case No. 880143 
Argument Priority 14a 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-




Cteric, Suprome Court Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M. 
BONHAM; BOYD F. SUMMERHAYS and 
ARLEEN M. SUMMERHAYS, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
•ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State Engi-
neer; SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CON-
SERVANCY DISTRICT, a political sub-
division of the State of Utah and a 
body corporate; and DRAPER IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
*ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State 
Engineer, is the only Defendant-
Respondent to this Appeal. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
ON APPEAL FROM RULE 54(b) FINAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MICHAEL M. QUEALY 
JOHN H. MABEY, JR. 
Assistant Attorneys General 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-




Case No. 880143 
Argument Priority 14a 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
Intrade Building South #14 
1399 South 700 East 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1 
NATURE OF THE CASE 2 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The State Engineerfs Motion for Summary Judgment 
Challenges Plaintiffs1 Basic Right to Appeal From 
The State Engineer's Decision As A Matter Of Law, 
And Is Ripe For Determination. . 9 
POINT II: Plaintiffs Are Not Aggrieved Persons Under Sec-
tion 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 17 
POINT III: The Criteria Of Section 73-3-8 Do Not Apply To 
Change Applications Filed Pursuant to Section 
73-3-3 33 
A. The Criteria for Approval of Change Applications 
is Limited to Those Contained in Section 73-3-3 . . . 34 
B. The Legislative Evolution of Section 73-3-3 
Supports our Construction 38 
C. The Caselaw Supports Our Position that the Only 
Criteria for Approval or Rejection of a Change App-
lication is Whether Other Rights will be Impaired . . 41 
D. Any Change in the Criteria for the Approval of 
Change Applications Must Come From the Legislature. . 47 
CONCLUSION , 49 
APPENDICES: See Index at beginning of Appendices 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
I, CASES CITED: 
Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 7 Ut.2d 53, 318 
P.2d 339 (1957) , , 13 
American Fork Irr. Co. v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 23 9 P.2d 
188 (1951) 42 
Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 
(Colo. 1951) . 46 
Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) 16 
Clarke v. Securities Industries Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 107 
S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987) 24, 25 
Colman v. State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2d 781 
(1965) 40 
Colorado Water Quality Control Comm'n v. Town of Frederick, 
641 P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982) 17 
Colthorpe v. Mountain Home Irr. Dist., 157 P.2d 1005 (Ida, 
1945) 45, 46 
Concerned Parents of Step Children v. Mitchell, 645 P.2d 
629 (Utah 1982) 40 
Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
13, 14, 19, 21, 22, 23, 42, 43 
Daniel Irrigation Co. v. Daniel Summit Co., 571 P.2d 1323 
(Utah 1977) . , , 20 
Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975). 21, 48 
DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, Utah Court of 
Appeals No. 870004-CA, decided November 8, 1988, Slip 
Opinion 11, 16 
Deseret Mortuary Co. v. State Securities Comm'n, 78 Utah 
393, 3 P.2d 267 (1931) 29, 30 
East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 
271 P.2d 449 (1954) 20, 42 
East Bench Irr. Co. v. State, 5 Utah 2d 235, 300 P.2d 603 
(1956). . . . . . . 23 
Page 
Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977) 16 
Eikenberger v. Nevada State Board of Accountancy, 531 P.2d 
853 (Nev. 1975) 17 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1983) 16 
Gifford-Hill & Co., Inc., v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 523 F.2d 
730 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 23, 24 
Glenwood Irrigation Company v. Myers, 24 Utah 2d 78, 465 
P.2d 1013 (1970) 18 
Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemicals Corp. v. Marsh, 596 
F.Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1984) 47 
Hegler Ranch, Inc., v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980) . 13 
Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 
1986) 40, 41 
Hollenbeck v. Granby Ditch Co., 420 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1966). . 46 
Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982). 13 
In Re Application of Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. App. 1988). 
44, 45 
In Re Johnson, 300 P. 492 (Ida. 1931). . 46 
J.J.N.P. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982) 48 
Lehmitz v. Utah Copper Company, 118 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 
(1941) 44 
Longenegger v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist., 483 P.2d 297 (N.M. 1971) 
46 
Madsen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985) 16 
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882 (1947) . 47 
Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 736 P.2d 
516 (Okla. 1987) 13, 28, 29, 48 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983) 13 
O'Hair V. White, 675 F.2d 680 (C.A. 5th 1982) 13 
Piute Res. & Irr. Co. v. West Panguitch Irr. & Res. Co., 13 
Utah 2d 6, 367 P.2d 855 (1962) 20, 42, 43 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 
1984) • . • .... 
Page 
13 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C,, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) . . 41 
Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow, 467 P.2d 395 (N.M. 1970). . , 29 
Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n., 2 
Utah 2d 141, 270 P.2d 453 (1954). . . . . . 19, 20, 42, 43 
Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., 605 P.2d 775 (Utah 1980) . . 16 
Spaeth v. Emmett, 383 P.2d 812 (Mont. 1963). . . . . . . . . 46 
Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 
1986) 25, 30 
United States v. Fourth District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 
1132 (1951), rehearing denied 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 
774 (1952) 20, 23, 42, 43 
Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490 (1975) . , , 12 
Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc., v. Wisconsin Department 
of Natural Resources, 424 N.W.2d 685 (Wis. 1988). . . . 
25, 26, 27, 28 
Wells Fargo Service Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 626 P.2d 
450 (Utah 1981) . . . . . . . . 40 
II. STATUTES AND RULES CITED: 
Section 63-46b-l, et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended (UAPA) , , . 2 
Section 73-1-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended . . . . 48 
Section 73-1-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended . . . . 32 
Section 73-3-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended , . . . 34 
Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (1980 Edition). . passim 
Section 73-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended . . . . 19 
Section 73-3-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended , . . . 19 
Section 73-3-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended . . . passim 
Page 
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
(1986 Cum. Supp.) . passim 
Section 73-3-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. . . . 21 
Section 78-2-2(3)(e)(v), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended 1 
1898 Utah Revised Statutes, Section 1276 39 
1919 Utah Revised Statutes 39 
1933 Utah Revised Statutes, Section 100-3-3 39 
1943 Utah Code Annotated 39 
Laws of Utah 198 6, Chapter 40, Section 1 . . . 40 
Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 1 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure .1, 4, 5 
III. MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES CITED: 
Clark, Waters and Water Rights, Section 412.2, p. 169 (1972) 
41 
Hutchins, Water Rights in the Nineteen Western States, Vol. 
1, pp. 632-633, Misc. Pub. 1206, U.S. Dept. of Agri-
culture (1971) 41 
Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 
3531 (1973) 12 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is based on Section 78-2-
2(3)(e)(v), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended; Rule 54(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and Rule 4(a), Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Are Plaintiffs-Appellants "aggrieved persons" pursuant 
to Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953 (effective until 
January 1, 1988) so as to entitle them to seek review of a 
Memorandum Decision of the State Engineer? 
2. Do the statutory criteria for the approval or rejection 
of applications to appropriate water contained in Section 73-3-
8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, also apply to the approval or 
rejection of applications to change the point of diversion, place 
or nature of use filed pursuant to Section 73-3-3, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953? 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The relevant statutory provisions which are determinative 
are Sections 73-3-3, 73-3-8 and 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended. 
1 
Section 73-3-3 was amended in 1986 to allow the filing of 
change applications by the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources 
for instream fishery purposes, and amended again in 1987 to 
conform to the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act (UAPA), Section 63-46b-l, et seq. The 1987 amendment also 
resulted in some reorganization and rewording of this Section, 
but the procedural and substantive criteria governing change 
applications is unchanged and remains the same as when the 
subject change application was approved by the State Engineer in 
1985. Agency actions (including judicial review) commenced prior 
to the adoption of UAPA are governed by the statutes in effect 
prior to the adoption of UAPA. See Section 63-46b-22. Sections 
73-3-3, 73-3-8 and 73-3-14, in their relevant forms, are repro-
duced as Appendix f!A!f hereto. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs filed this action in numerous counts seeking 
redress for claimed flood damage to their property located in 
Salt Lake County which they allege occurred due to certain 
activities of the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and 
Draper Irrigation Company (co-applicants on the subject change 
application). The great majority of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended 
Complaint ("Complaint") sounds in tort and is directed solely 
toward Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper 
2 
Irrigation Company (R. 53). However, Count I of Plaintiffs1 
Complaint raises a totally separate cause of action (R. 53-62). 
Count I seeks a de novo review of the Memorandum Decision of the 
Utah State Engineer dated December 26, 1985, which approved 
Change Application No. 57-3411 (a-13077) filed by Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company. 
A copy of the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision appears in 
the Record at R. 80, and is attached hereto as Appendix "B". 
In the court below, the State Engineer challenged Plain-
tiffs1 status as "aggrieved persons" to seek review of his deci-
sion approving the change application because Plaintiffs are not 
water users and own no rights which could be impaired by the 
change. Further, both the State Engineer and the court below 
found that the grounds for Plaintiffsf protest to the change were 
outside of the statutory criteria for the approval or rejection 
of change applications under Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated. 
The issues raised by this appeal do not go to the merits of 
whether or not the change application should have been approved. 
Rather, the issue is whether Plaintiffs have a statutory right to 
seek such review at all. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs filed this action on February 24, 1986, seeking a 
de novo review of the State Engineer's decision (Count I) and, in 
3 
other Counts, seeking damages and other relief against Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company 
(R. 2) . The Complaint was amended in March of 1986 (R. 25), and 
again in February of 1987 (R. 53). 
The State Engineer filed his Answer (R. 132), raising 
several affirmative defenses including: (a) Plaintiffs are not 
"aggrieved persons" within the meaning of Section 73-3-14; and 
(b) the criteria set forth in Section 73-3-8 (on which Plaintiff 
Bonham based his protest) are only applicable to applications for 
new appropriations and not to applications to change existing 
rights under Section 73-3-3 (R. 139).1 
On July 27, 1987, Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the 
above-stated defenses (R. 193, at 197). The District Court 
denied the motion to strike on August 31, 1987 (R. 288). 
On September 8, 1987, the State Engineer filed a motion for 
summary judgment on Count I (R. 293) based on the above-stated 
defenses, which the District Court granted by Memorandum Decision 
dated December 4, 1987 (R. 519). After some disagreement among 
the parties as to whether judgment should be certified as a final 
judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P., the District Court, on 
March 14, 1988, issued its Judgment and Order and certified the 
1. Identical defenses were raised by the other named 
Defendants (R. 148-149, 168). 
4 
same under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. (R. 599).2 Copies of the Dis-
trict Court's Memorandum Decision and Judgment are attached 
hereto as Appendix "C". 
Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April 11, 1988 
(R. 609). Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary disposition with 
this Court on May 26, 1988, which was denied on June 7, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Contrary to Plaintiffs1 assertions, the material facts 
relevant to the granting of Summary Judgment in this case are 
neither complex or controverted. 
Change Application No. 57-3411 (a-13077) was filed by Salt 
Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation 
Company pursuant to Section 73-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended (R. 80). The application sought to change the point of 
diversion, place and nature of use of certain water rights in 
Bell Canyon, the Middle and South Forks of Dry Creek, Rocky Mouth 
and Big Willow Creeks (R. 80-81). By the change, Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District proposed to convey the water to 
its treatment plant for use by its municipal customers (R. 81). 
Notice of the change application was published in the 
2. Summary Judgment was granted only as to Count I (the 
appeal from the State Engineer's decision). The other Counts of 
the Second Amended Complaint—directed to the other named Defen-
dants—remain ongoing in the District Court. 
5 
Deseret News from June 28, 1984, through July 12, 1984 (R. 81)• 
Of the named Plaintiffs, only Stanley Bonham protested the change 
application, and there were no protests filed by any water users 
(R. 81). Plaintiff Bonham's protest was based on his allegations 
that the proposed change would cause flooding of his and other 
property and would therefore be detrimental to the public welfare 
(R. 81). 
Plaintiffs have not alleged that they own any water rights 
in the subject area, nor have they alleged that the proposed 
change would impair any vested water rights owned by them (R. 53-
62). Indeed, Plaintiffs own no water rights (see Affidavit of 
Kent Jones, R. 291-292, and Appendix l!D!l hereto), and Plaintiffs 
so concede (see Appellants1 Brief at p. 26). 
On February 26, 1985, a hearing was held by the State 
Engineer on the subject change application which was attended by 
the applicants and protestant Stanley Bonham (R. 81). Subsequent 
to the hearing, the State Engineer had members of his staff 
conduct a field examination of the area at which representatives 
of the applicants and Mr. Bonham were present (R. 81). 
On December 26, 1985, the State Engineer issued his Memoran-
dum Decision (Appendix "B" hereto) approving the change applica-
tion on the grounds that: (1) the State Engineer had no statu-
tory authority in acting upon the change application to consider 
damage to land that may be caused by project construction, and 
6 
such concerns were not relevant to the change application pro-
cess; and (2) there was no evidence to indicate that the proposed 
change would interfere with other existing water rights (R. 81)• 
Plaintiffs then filed this action seeking a de novo review 
of the State Enginer's decision (Count I), and in other Counts 
seeking damages and other relief against co-applicants Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation Company 
(R. 53) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State Engineer's motion for summary judgment was based 
on the propositions that (1) Plaintiffs were not "aggrieved 
persons" under Section 73-3-14 and therefore lacked standing to 
appeal the State Engineer's decision, and (2) the criteria on 
which Plaintiffs based their protest were not applicable to 
change applications. The motion was entirely appropriate in that 
it challenged Plaintiffs1 basic right to maintain Count I of the 
Complaint, and was clearly ripe for adjudication at an early 
stage of the proceeding. The relevant facts underlying that 
motion are not controverted. 
In a nutshell, our position is that the statutory water 
rights change application process is narrow in scope and is 
governed exclusively by Section 73-3-3, and the only issue before 
the State Engineer, the District Court, and this Court on appeal 
7 
is whether there is reason to believe that the subject change 
could be accomplished without impairing other vested water 
rights. Plaintiffs are not water users and have no water rights 
to be impaired by the subject change; they therefore cannot be 
"aggrieved parties" under Section 73-3-14. The concerns they 
raise, even if valid, are outside the limited statutory criteria 
governing the approval or rejection of change applications, and, 
unless Plaintiffs can demonstrate that they have interests within 
the "zone" the change application process is meant to protect or 
regulate, they cannot seek review of the State Engineer's 
decision. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to gain "aggrieved person" status by 
alleging that the broader criteria governing new applications to 
appropriate under Section 73-3-8 also apply to change applica-
tions. They are wrong. The only criteria for the approval or 
rejection of a change application is whether there is reason to 
believe that the change can be made without impairing other 
vested water rights. Plaintiffs cannot be deemed to be "ag-
grieved persons" since they cannot meet their statutory burden of 
showing that the change will impair their water rights—because 
they own none. Sound statutory construction, the legislative 
history of Section 73-3-3, and existing caselaw are contrary to 
Plaintiffs' contention that the criteria of Section 73-3-8 apply 
to change applications. Further, since the only criteria for the 
8 
approval or rejection of a change application is the impairment 
of other water rights, Plaintiffs not only lack the right to seek 
review of the State Engineer's decision, but could not prevail on 
the merits even if the matter were to go to trial. 
It should be emphasized that the granting of Summary Judg-
ment against Plaintiffs on Count I of the Complaint does not 
leave them without viable remedies for alleged flood damage 
arising out of the activities of Salt Lake County Water Conser-
vancy District and Draper Irrigation Company. The granting of 
Summary Judgment on Count I left intact Plaintiffs1 other claims 
for damages, inverse condemnation, and injunctive relief as 
against the other Defendants below (see Complaint, R. 62-79; and 
the Judgment of the District Court, R. 599-601, Appendix nC!f) . 
All of such other claims provide Plaintiffs with a full oppor-
tunity to air those issues before the District Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The State Engineer's Motion For Summary Judcrment 
Challenges Plaintiffs1 Basic Right To Appeal From 
The State Engineer's Decision As A Matter Of Law, 
And Is Ripe For Determination, 
In Point 1 of their brief, Plaintiffs claim the State 
Engineerfs motion for summary judgment is not ripe for determina-
tion (Appellants1 Brief, p. 14). Plaintiffs thus misunderstand 
what this appeal is all about, and the arguments in Point 1 of 
their brief beg the question on the issues now before the Court. 
9 
The State Engineer's motion for summary judgment was not 
directed to the merits of the case per se. Rather, it was 
directed to whether or not (regardless of Plaintiffs1 factual 
allegations) Plaintiffs were entitled as a matter of law to seek 
an appeal from the State Engineer's Memorandum Decision. The 
issue is whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" under Section 
73-3-14 and have standing to bring this action at all. It is a 
question going to the basic jurisdiction of the Court, and was 
properly raised and decided as a matter of law. 
The State Engineer's motion for summary judgment was based 
on two separate affirmative defenses raised in his Answer. The 
Fifth Defense of the Answer stated, "Plaintiffs are not aggrieved 
parties under the provisions of Section 73-3-14 . . . and there-
fore lack standing and are otherwise not entitled to prosecute 
this appeal" (R. 139). Thus, the basic capacity of Plaintiffs to 
bring this action (Count I) was called into question. 
The Sixth Defense raised the issue of whether the criteria 
of Section 73-3-8—the sole basis of Plaintiffs' protest to the 
subject change application—were applicable, as a matter of law, 
to change applications filed under Section 73-3-3. If those 
criteria are inapplicable (and we claim they are not), Plaintiffs 
have no legal basis for objecting to the change application. 
Both of these defenses raise questions of law, and were 
properly decided by summary judgment. 
10 
This is an action to review an administrative decision of 
the State Engineer pursuant to Section 73-3-14. Unless Plain-
tiffs are "aggrieved persons11 they have no right to seek such 
review. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Point 
II, infra. Plaintiffs have a right to seek review of an ad-
ministrative decision only where the legislature has so provided. 
In a very recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals denied review of 
an administrative decision where the statute did not so provide: 
This general statute [Section 78-2a-3(2)(a)] defines 
the outermost limits of our appellate jurisdiction, 
allowing us to review agency decisions only when the 
legislature expressly authorizes a right of review 
[citing authority]. It is not a catchall provision 
authorizing us to review the orders of every adminis-
trative agency for which there is no statute specifi-
cally creating a right to judicial review. In the 
absence of such a specific statute, we have no juris-
diction." DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 
Utah Court of Appeals No. 87 0004-CA, decided November 
8, 1988. Slip Op. at 2. (A copy of the Court of 
Appeals decision is attached hereto as Appendix "E".) 
In the case of judicial review of decisions of the Utah 
State Engineer, the legislature has provided that only persons 
legally "aggrieved" may seek such review. Thus, the State 
Engineerfs motion for summary judgment goes to whether or not 
Plaintiffs meet this standard. 
Plaintiffs argue there are factual disputes which require 
the taking of evidence (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 14-19). Not so. 
We claimed—and the District Court held—that the change applica-
tion process under Section 73-3-3 is narrow in scope, and the 
11 
only issue before the State Engineer and the courts on appeal is 
whether there is reason to believe that the change could be made 
without impairing other vested water rights (R. 52 0-521, Appendix 
"C"). That being the case, the only material fact relevant to 
whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" under Section 73-3-14 
is whether they own water rights which might be impaired by the 
change. 
It is uncohtroverted that Plaintiffs do not own any water 
rights (see Affidavit of Kent Jones, R. 291-292, Appendix "D"). 
Plaintiffs in fact concede they do not own any water rights 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 26). The "facts" which Plaintiffs claim 
are disputed relate to the merits of their claim—not to the 
threshold issue of whether they are "aggrieved persons" having 
standing to bring the action in the first place. "Standing 
doctrines [or aggrieved person status in administrative appeals] 
are employed to refuse to determine the merits of a legal claim, 
on the ground that even though the claim may be correct, the 
litigant advancing it is not properly situated to be entitled to 
its judicial determination." Wright and Miller, Section 3531. 
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, " . . . [T]he 
standing question . . . is whether the constitutional or statu-
tory provision on which the claim rests properly can be under-
stood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to 
judicial relief." Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
12 
The standing doctrine focuses on the particular plaintiff, not on 
the issues or merits of the case. See O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 
680, 685 (C.A. 5th 1982). "One who is not 'aggrieved1 by a 
decision—however erroneous—may not bring a challenge to its 
validity." Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 
736 P.2d 516, 520 (Okla. 1987).3 
This Court has noted that "the mere existence of genuine 
issues of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude the entry 
of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution 
of the case." Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1982). See also Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 7 
Ut.2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 (1957); Healer Ranch, Inc., v. Stillman, 
619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980); Reagan Outdoor Advertising v. 
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984); and Norton v. Blackham, 
669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). 
The only material fact in determining whether or not Plain-
tiffs are "aggrieved persons" is whether they own water rights— 
and it is uncontroverted that they do not. Any other perceived 
factual disputes are simply irrelevant to that issue. 
Plaintiffs cite Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), 
3. Plaintiffs certainly did not believe the issue to be 
premature when they filed their motion to strike this defense. 
In fact, the arguments in support of Plaintiffs1 motion to strike 
are in direct conflict with those in Point I of their brief (R. 
193-200, 201-235). 
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for the proposition that it is impossible to obtain summary 
judgment in reviewing a decision of the State Engineer. That is 
not an accurate statement. Crafts dealt with a reversal of 
summary judgment on the merits where there were conflicting 
expert affidavits (667 P.2d at 1080). That case did not deal 
with standing.4 The Court in Crafts noted: 
We do not mean to suggest by this observation that 
summary judgment is not available in a hearing de novo 
concerning a determination of the State Engineer. 
Where the requirements of Rule 56 are met, a moving 
party would of course be entitled to relief. (667 P.2d 
at 1080-1081.) 
Plaintiffs seem to suggest that a full hearing on the merits is 
necessary to determine the threshold issue of whether Plaintiffs 
have a right to maintain this action. Such is not the law, and 
does not make any sense. Either Plaintiffs are aggrieved persons 
or they are not. The lower court held they were not, and proper-
ly granted our motion for summary judgment. 
Next, Plaintiffs argue that there is a factual dispute as to 
"whether the State Engineer properly performed his statutory 
duties pursuant to the provisions of Section 73-3-8" to determine 
whether the change application would be detrimental to the public 
welfare (Appellant!s Brief at p. 18). This again begs the 
4. In fact, this Court in Crafts affirmed a partial summary 
judgment dismissing the action as against parties who were not 
water users (667 P.2d at 1081, Note 6). 
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question. The issue before the District Court on summary judg-
ment was whether the criteria of Section 73-3-8 were applicable 
to change applications at all. That is a question of law to be 
determined by statutory construction, and does not involve any 
facts—disputed or otherwise. Since, as we will demonstrate in 
Point III, infra, the criteria of Section 73-3-8 are not ap-
plicable to change applications, it is totally irrelevant whether 
or not the State Engineer undertook an investigation into those 
issues. Further, since Plaintiffs do not own any water rights, 
and since the only issue before the State Engineer is whether the 
proposed change will impair other vested water rights, it would 
be impossible for Plaintiffs to prevail on the merits if the 
criteria of Section 73-3-8 are inapplicable to change applica-
tions. Thus, the applicability of the Section 73-3-8 criteria 
goes—as a matter of law—to the issue of whether Plaintiffs can 
even state a cause of action. 
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that the granting of summary 
judgment denied them access to the courts under the Utah Con-
stitution. That claim is improperly raised and lacks merit. 
First of all, this argument is improperly raised for the 
first time on appeal. Other than a passing reference in Plain-
tiffs1 memorandum in opposition to summary judgment (R. 491), 
there is nothing in the record or in Plaintiffs1 docketing 
statement to indicate that this issue was directly raised below, 
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and it cannot now be presented for the first time on appeal: 
11
 . . . it is axiomatic that matters not presented to 
the trial court may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal.11 (Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development 
Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).) 
See also Shavne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., 605 P.2d 775 (Utah 
1980), and Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977). This 
fundamental principle of appellate practice applies to constitu-
tional issues as well as other matters. Madsen v. Brown, 701 
P.2d 1086, 1088 (Utah 1985), and Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 
(Utah 1982). 
As discussed above, a person does not have an absolute right 
to seek judicial review of agency action unless the legislature 
so provides. See DeBry v. Salt Lake County Board of Appeals, 
supra, slip opinion, Appendix "E". Clearly, Plaintiffs have a 
right to pursue their actions in tort and injunction against Salt 
Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper Irrigation 
Company, and they are not without a remedy in the courts. 
However, they cannot transform the narrow statutory administra-
tive process dealing with change applications into a broad 
panacea for all of the grievances set forth in their Complaint. 
Plaintiffs1 argument that the motion for summary judgment 
was premature must fail. The motion was directed to the thresh-
old issue of whether Plaintiffs are "aggrieved persons" and 
whether the broader criteria of Section 73-3-8 are applicable to 
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change applications. As to those issues of law, there is no 
material factual dispute. 
POINT II: Plaintiffs Are Not Aggrieved Persons Under 
Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Annotated. 
This is not a proper appeal from a decision of the State 
Engineer as Plaintiffs allege. Plaintiffs1 water rights are not 
at stake. Plaintiffs are attempting to use the State Engineer's 
administrative process to stop the construction of waterworks 
facilities which they allege will damage their real property. 
Plaintiffs do not own any water rights, nor do they allege that 
any such rights will be impaired (see Affidavit of Kent Jones, R. 
291-292, Appendix lfDff) . 
Plaintiffs, not being water users, cannot be aggrieved 
persons under Section 73-3-14, and cannot pursue this appeal.5 
Plaintiffs are free to pursue any action based on damages or 
other legal theories against Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District or Draper Irrigation Company (if any exist),6 but such 
matters are clearly improper in the context of an action to 
5. Other than Plaintiff Bonham, none of the other Plain-
tiffs were parties before the State Engineer. That alone would 
deprive them of "aggrieved person11 status. See Eikenberger v. 
Nevada State Board of Accountancy, 531 P.2d 853 (Nev. 1975), and 
Colorado Water Quality Control Commfn v. Town of Frederick, 641 
P.2d 958 (Colo. 1982). 
6. Those causes of action—the remaining Counts of the 
Complaint—are still pending below and are unaffected by the 
granting of summary judgment on Count I. 
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review an administrative decision of the State Engineer on a 
change application. In their effort to seek monetary damages and 
other relief, Plaintiffs want to transform the administrative 
process governing change applications into something not per-
mitted by the Utah Water Code or the decisions of this Court. 
The statutory process governing changes in point of diver-
sion, place or nature of use of water is set forth in Section 73-
3-3, and is narrow and limited in nature. A water user in Utah 
has the statutory right to change the point of diversion, place 
or nature of use of his water right so long as there is no 
impairment of other vested water rights or enlargement of the 
right being changed. The administrative process involving change 
applications (including appeals) is for the protection of vested 
water rights and the proper administration of the Statef s water 
resources—nothing more. Section 73-3-3 provides in part that: 
Any person entitled to the use of water may change the 
place of diversion or use and may use the water for 
other purposes than those for which it was originally 
appropriated, but no such change may be made if it 
impairs any vested right without just compensation. 
Any change in the point of diversion or in the place or 
nature of use can only be accomplished upon the approval of the 
State Engineer. An application must be filed, and notice given 
to other water users. See Glenwood Irrigation Company v. Myers, 
24 Utah 2d 78, 465 P.2d 1013 (1970). The administrative process 
includes the publishing of notice of the proposed change in a 
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local newspaper once a week for three weeks (Section 73-3-6), and 
an opportunity for protests to be filed (Section 73-3-7). If the 
application is protested, the State Engineer then holds a hearing 
on the matter. In this proceeding, not one water user filed a 
protest claiming the change would impair any vested water rights. 
All the State Engineer determines in connection with a change 
application is whether there is reason to believe the proposed 
change can be made without impairing other vested water rights. 
As this Court stated in Crafts v. Hansen, 667 P.2d 1068, 1070 
(Utah 1983): 
Thus, it is the State Engineer's obligation before 
approving a change application, to determine that no 
vested water right will be impaired by the proposed 
change. On plenary review, the trial court has the 
same obligation. This Court has described the standard 
for that determination as follows: 
If the evidence shows that there is reason to 
believe that the proposed change can be made 
without impairing vested rights the application 
should be approved. The owner of a water right 
has a vested right to the quality as well as the 
quantity which he has beneficially used. A change 
application cannot be rejected without a showing 
that vested rights will thereby be substantially 
impaired. While the applicant has the general 
burden of showing that no impairment of vested 
rights will result from the change, the person 
opposing such application must fail if the evi-
dence does not disclose that his rights will be 
impaired. Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs 
Water Users Assfn., 2 Utah 2d 141, 143-144, 270 
P.2d 453, 455 (1954). (Emphasis added.) 
The reason for protecting other vested rights—even if 
junior in priority—makes sense. Other existing users are 
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entitled to have stream or groundwater conditions exist as they 
did when they made their appropriations. A water user, even with 
an earlier priority, cannot by change application increase his 
historic depletion of water to the detriment of other existing 
water users. See Piute Res, & Irr. Co, v. West Panguitch Irr. & 
Res, Co,, 13 Utah 2d 6, 8, 367 P.2d 855 (1962); East Bench Irr, 
Co, v, Deseret Irr, Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 177, 271 P.2d 449 (1954); 
Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Assfn, 2 Utah 2d 
141, 270 P.2d 453 (1954); United States v. Fourth District Court, 
121 Utah 18, 24, 242 P.2d 774 (1952); and Daniel Irrigation Co, 
v, Daniel Summit Co,, 571 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1977). The specific 
statutory criteria governing the approval and rejection of change 
applications is discussed in more detail in Point III, infra. 
The narrow administrative process provided for in Section 
73-3-3 is to protect other vested water rights while allowing 
changes in water rights where no enlargement or impairment 
occurs. That is the limited "zone of interest" to be protected 
by the administrative process, and Plaintiffs1 claim that the 
proposed change will damage their real property does not fall 
within it.7 
7. Interests other than impairment of water rights are 
considered by the State Engineer in passing on applications to 
appropriate water under Section 73-3-8, but, as discussed in 
Point III, infra, such criteria do not apply to change applica-
tions. 
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The only issue that could properly be raised before the 
State Engineer was impairment. Court review of the State En-
gineer's decisions is likewise strictly limited to those issues 
which could have been raised before the State Engineer (Crafts v. 
Hansen, supra). Unless Plaintiffs can demonstrate impairment of 
a water right, they were not properly before the State Engineer 
below and are not proper parties to seek this review.8 
All final decisions of the State Engineer are subject to 
judicial review as provided for in Sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15, 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 73-3-14 specifies in part: 
In any case where a decision of the state engineer is 
involved any person aggrieved by such decision may 
within sixty days after notice thereof bring a civil 
action in the district court for a plenary review 
thereof. 
Section 73-3-15 provides that " . . . the hearing in the district 
court shall proceed as a trial de novo . . .." Thus, the legis-
lature carefully structured the appeals provision of the Utah 
Water Code to give those water users involved in the administra-
tive process before the State Engineer the right to review 
8. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature in 
providing for a fairly narrow process in acting on change ap-
plications. However, this Court has noted, in passing on the 
statutory two-year limitation on prosecuting appeals from State 
Engineer decisions, that: 
Some may not approve the legislation, subject of this 
case, . . . . We are not they that may question the 
wisdom of the legislature on any constitutional or 
prejudiciality basis under the circumstances here. 
(Dansie v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975). 
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actions taken by the State Engineer, but limited such review to 
those matters which could have properly been presented to and 
decided by the State Engineer. Certainly this gives any water 
user aggrieved by a decision of the State Engineer ample oppor-
tunity to have his day in court, but it likewise protects and 
preserves the administrative structure by preventing other issues 
not relevant to a specific decision from being prematurely liti-
gated or raised in an inappropriate forum. Any other result 
would effectively undermine the administrative process by allow-
ing water users to raise on appeal a variety of issues which may 
not be related to the specific decision in question. Such a 
result is neither prejudicial nor unfair to the parties to such 
appeal, and is essential to the preservation of the administra-
tive structure provided for in the Utah Water Code. 
If there were any doubt about the legislative intent in this 
regard, this Court has laid that matter to rest. A number of 
decisions have addressed this subject and have consistently and 
uniformly held that the trial court's review is a limited one and 
is confined to those issues which the statute delegated to the 
State Engineer to decide in the first instance: 
The statutes governing these actions, U.C.A., 
1953, §§73-3-14 & 15, specify that a party aggrieved by 
a decision of the State Engineer is entitled to "plen-
ary review11 in the district court, and that f![t]he 
hearing in the district court shall proceed as a trial 
de novo and shall be tried to the court as other 
equitable actions." The issues at such hearing are, 
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however, strictly limited to those which were, or could 
have been, raised before the State Engineer. (Crafts 
v. Hansen, supra, at 1070; Emphasis added.) 
This Court had earlier explained that: 
Such action is strictly limited to the trial of such 
issues as could have been raised before the engineer, 
and an appeal to this court is provided from the 
decision of the district court. The decision of these 
courts on such an appeal from the State Engineerf s 
decision has the same effect and no more on the rights 
of the applicants to proceed with their proposed 
project as the decision of the engineer would have had 
without an appeal. (East Bench Irrigation Co. v. 
State, 5 Utah 2d 235, 239, 300 P.2d 603 (1956).) 
See also United States v. Fourth District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 
P.2d 1132 (1951), rehearing denied 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 
(1952). 
Not only is our position supported by the law governing 
change applications, it is also supported by legal principles 
governing participation in administrative actions generally. In 
many ways a person's status as an "aggrieved party" in an ad-
ministrative proceeding is akin to standing. In fact, most cases 
equate the terms. The general rule is that even if some "injury" 
can be shown by a plaintiff because of administrative action, 
plaintiff nevertheless will lack standing to challenge adminis-
trative action unless the alleged injury is to an interest within 
the "zone of interest" sought to be regulated or protected by the 
statutes and agency. In Gifford-Hill & Co., Inc., v. Federal 
Trade Comm'n, 523 F.2d 730, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the Court of 
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Appeals stated: 
A plaintiff has standing to challenge an administrative 
action . . . if the challenged action caused it "injury 
in fact" and if "the alleged injury was to an interest 
1
 arguably within the zone of interests to be protected 
or regulated1 by the statutes the agencies were claimed 
to have violated." (Emphasis added.) 
Plaintiffs allege that they "have an economic as well as a 
direct, personal interest in the State Engineer's decision." But 
they have no water rights, and the "zone of interest" sought to 
be protected in the change application process is other vested 
water rights—nothing else. 
Plaintiffs criticize us for not citing the Court to Clarice 
v. Securities Industries Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 
L.Ed.2d 757 (1987) (Appellants1 Brief at 34). Such criticism is 
unwarranted. Clarke generally stands for the above-quoted 
proposition that the alleged harm must come within the "zone" 
sought to be regulated. However, it must be remembered that 
federal regulatory programs generally—and the regulatory scheme 
involved in Clarke specifically—are usually much broader in 
scope than the narrow administrative process involved in change 
applications. In Clarke, a large national bank had applied to 
the Comptroller of the Currency under the McFadden Act for 
permission to establish affiliate discount brokerage services at 
its branch offices and at other locations outside its home state. 
The application was granted. A trade association representing 
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securities brokers and investment bankers appealed the approval 
of the permit. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was 
within the "zone of interest" and had standing since the inter-
ests it was asserting had a reasonable relationship with the 
policies underlying the McFadden Act, which sought to keep 
national banks from gaining a monopoly over credit and banking 
generally. Regulation of the national banking industry is 
obviously a broad regulatory scheme, as are many other federal 
administrative programs. That, however, is a far cry from the 
very narrow process for acting on change applications as set 
forth in Section 73-3-3, and Clarke is simply distinguishable on 
its facts. As this Court observed in Terracor v. Utah Board of 
State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986), " . . . it is difficult to 
make useful, all inclusive generalizations that determine whether 
standing exists in any given case, since the issue often depends 
on the facts of each case." Likewise, the other cases cited by 
Plaintiffs all involved broad regulatory schemes. 
We submit that state court cases applying the "zone of 
interest" test to more narrow regulatory programs are much more 
akin to the case at bar than federal cases. One such case is 
Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc., v. Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources, 424 N.W.2d 685 (Wis. 1988). In that case, 
Wisconsin had created a program for the licensing and regulation 
of sanitary landfills, under which the State Department of 
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Natural Resources was to make determinations of the feasibility 
and need for any new or proposed landfills. Pursuant to this 
program, a landfill operator filed an application to construct a 
new landfill. Waste Management, Inc., filed a protest to the 
granting of the permit, claiming the construction of the new 
landfill would divert business away from its existing facility in 
the same general area and would cause it economic harm because of 
increased competition. The state agency considered the protest, 
but nevertheless issued the permit for the new facility. Waste 
Management, Inc., sought review in the courts, and the issue was 
whether the company was an aggrieved party entitled to seek 
judicial review of the agency action. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court held that even if the plaintiff would suffer some economic 
injury by the granting of the permit, such injury was not within 
the "zone of interest" the regulatory program was intended to 
protect and ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge 
the agency decision. That Court first outlined the zone of 
interest test as follows: 
The Wisconsin rule of standing envisions a two-step 
analysis conceptually similar to the analysis required 
by the federal rule. The first step under the Wiscon-
sin rule is to ascertain whether the decision of the 
agency directly causes injury to the interest of the 
petitioner. The second step is to determine whether 
the interest asserted is recognized by law. This 
approach is similar to the two-pronged standing anal-
ysis outlined by the United States Supreme Court ... as 
follows: (1) Does the challenged action cause the 
petitioner injury in fact? and (2) is the interest 
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allegedly injured arguably within the zone of interests 
to be protected or regulated by the statute or consti-
tutional guarantee in question? (424 N.W.2d at 687.) 
The Court then reasoned that even if Waste Management, Inc., 
could show some injury attributable to the granting of the 
permit, the injury was not within the zone of interest sought to 
be protected: 
Turning to the dispositive question . . . under the 
two-step analysis employed in these cases, the con-
trolling issue is whether the economic injury which 
Waste Management alleges it will suffer is an injury to 
an interest of a type recognized, regulated, or sought 
to be protected by sec. 144.44(2)(nm), Stats. 
fid, at 688). 
* * * * 
The nature of the statute, as well as the nature 
of the determination of need, make clear that the 
interest protected, recognized, or regulated by the law 
is an environmental interest. In this case, the 
environmental issue is the appropriate ultimate dis-
position of solid waste in a densely populated eight-
county corner of the state. 
In this context, an argument for standing based on 
alleged harm to an economic interest must fail. The 
statute at issue here . . . does not recognize, nor 
does it attempt to recrulate or protect an economic 
interest. For this reason, an alleged harm to Waste 
Management's economic interest does not satisfy the 
second part of the two-step analysis . . . . (Id. at 
689; Emphasis added.)3 
9. Plaintiffs argue that since the State Engineer allowed 
Plaintiff Bonham to participate at the administrative level, that 
gives them status as aggrieved persons. The Wisconsin Court 
disposed of a similar argument as follows: 
Under Wisconsin law, it is clear that, just 
because a party has requested and been granted an 
administrative hearing, the party does not obtain 
thereby the standing to challenge the resulting ad-
ministrative decision. [Citing authority.] (424 
N.W.2d at 686, N.2). 
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The analogy of Waste Management to the case at bar is clear• 
As in Waste Management, here we have a very narrow administrative 
process geared solely to allowing changes in water rights so long 
as other water rights are not impaired. Plaintiffs1 interests 
are not within that narrow "zone." Like Waste Managementf 
"Plaintiffs have alleged . . . their personal, economic and 
direct interest in the Engineer's Memorandum Decision" (Appel-
lants1 Brief, p. 25). That is not enough to make them "aggrieved 
persons." 
Another analogous case is Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor 
Vehicle Comm'n, 736 P.2d 516 (Okla. 1987). In that case, an 
Oklahoma statute prohibited the licensing of new car dealerships 
within a ten-mile radius of an existing dealership selling the 
same make of cars. The applicant sought a dealership license 
which was granted by the Motor Vehicle Commission. Other dealers 
sued, seeking an injunction against the issuance of the license. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the protesting dealers 
lacked standing because they were all located outside of the ten-
mile radius. The Court stated: 
This statute clearly does give standing to protest the 
establishment of a new dealer franchise to other 
dealers of the same line-make located within ten miles 
of the proposed site of the new franchise. However, in 
the present case, appellant dealers of the same line-
make are not located within ten miles of the new 
franchise which they seek to challenge. The trial 
court correctly ruled that this statute did not grant 
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appellants the requisite standing to require OMVC to 
consider their objection to the proposed new franchise. 
(736 P.2d at 518.) 
* * * * 
As reflected in section 579(5), the Legislature 
was cognizant in passing this legislation that competi-
tion, if fair, is in the public interest. The Legisla-
ture made a choice in this legislation to regard the 
establishment of a new dealership in an area more than 
ten miles distant from an established dealer as pre-
sumptively fair competition and in the public interest. 
This legislation provides for no protest in that event, 
and it is quite clear that we may not infer an intent 
to the contrary. (Id. at 519.) 
* * * * 
. . . The legislation does not provide for protests 
outside of those circumstances. Any attempt by OMVC to 
provide for protests outside of those authorized by the 
legislation would be beyond its authority. For this 
reason appellants again lack a legally cognizable 
interest in the issue tendered for determination. . . 
. As stated by this Court in Democratic Party of 
Oklahoma v. Estep, "One who is not 'aggrieved1 by a 
decision—however erroneous—may not bring a challenge 
to its validity." (Id. at 520.) 
See also Ruidoso State Bank v. Brumlow, 467 P.2d 395 (N.M. 1970). 
In Deseret Mortuary Co. v. State Securities Comm!ny 78 Utah 
393, 3 P.2d 267 (1931), this Court rendered a decision quite 
close in reasoning to the more recent "zone of interest" cases. 
In that case, Deseret sought permission from the State Securities 
Commission to register stock for public sale. The Utah Funeral 
Director's Association and the Ogden Chamber of Commerce pro-
tested the proposed registration and appealed the Commission 
ruling allowing it. The Court held that the two entities lacked 
standing because the administrative process was limited in scope 
and was geared to protecting "issuers, dealers or salesmen of 
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securities," and that only those persons had standing. Likewise, 
the administrative process here is geared only toward the protec-
tion of other vested water rights. 
This Court's decision in Terracor v. Utah Board of State 
Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986), is also instructive. In that 
case plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus against the Board of 
State Lands to rescind a special use lease issued to a compet-
itor, which plaintiff claimed was issued in violation of State 
law. This Court (sua sponte) held that plaintiff lacked standing 
to challenge the Board action because it had relinquished its 
claim to the property. Here, Plaintiffs have no water rights 
which could be impaired by the proposed change. 
Because water is the lifeblood of this arid State, much of 
the varied development that occurs here is dependent on a water 
supply. Decisions of the State Engineer regarding the allocation 
and distribution of water may thus indirectly or collaterally 
affect many interests of many people. However, the change 
application process, as created by the legislature in Section 73-
3-3 is for the limited purpose of controlling the change of water 
rights while protecting other water users from any impairment to 
their rights which the change may cause. People or groups may be 
opposed to the granting of a change application because of the 
attendant ramifications thereof; but, unless they are water users 
themselves, they cannot be "aggrieved persons" under the stat-
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utory administrative process so as to entitle them to appeal a 
State Engineerfs decision. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs1 unsubstantiated assertions (Appel-
lants1 Brief, p. 27), the State Engineer does not consider 
himself to be "above the law" in challenging Plaintiffs1 standing 
to seek review of the subject Memorandum Decision. Quite the 
contrary. The State Engineer has a legitimate interest in pre-
serving the integrity of his administrative processes and in 
limiting the issues before him to those within the authority 
granted him by the legislature. That is not only appropriate, 
but is his duty. For Plaintiffs to claim otherwise is both wrong 
and inappropriate. 
Plaintiffs also allege that in granting the subject change 
application, the State Engineer is somehow to blame for the 
alleged flood damage to their property. That argument borders on 
absurdity. There is simply no logical cause and effect relation-
ship between the granting of the change application and the 
alleged damage suffered by Plaintiffs. All the State Engineer's 
decision did was to approve a change in point of diversion and 
place and nature of use of a water right. It certainly did not 
authorize the applicants to damage or take any of Plaintiffs' 
property. How an applicant physically accomplishes a change is 
the applicant's responsibility. If, in the process of making a 
change in point of diversion or place or nature of use of the 
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water, the water user causes damage to the property of others he 
may well be held liable for any such damage. But that is not the 
concern of the State Engineer. Further, State law requires all 
water users to use due care in their use of water. Section 73-1-
8 states: 
The owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other water-
course shall maintain the same in repair so as to 
prevent waste of water or damage to the property of 
others . . . (Emphasis added.) 
At the risk of being repetitive, it is to be emphasized 
that the granting of summary judgment in favor of the State 
Engineer as to Count I has no effect whatsoever on Plaintiffs1 
other claims for damages and injunctive relief. Those claims are 
set forth in great detail under various legal theories in the 
other Counts of the Complaint (R. 62-79), and are still actively 
pending against the other named Defendants in the lower court. 
Plaintiffs will have their day in court on those causes of action 
and are not left without a remedy.10 Plaintiffs are attempting 
to use the Stcite Engineer's limited administrative process for a 
purpose it was never intended to serve. 
10. Plaintiffs1 prolix description of the alleged flooding 
of their property, which reads like a "hydrologic Armageddon," 
is immaterial to the issues now before the Court on summary 
judgment for the reasons heretofore discussed in Point I, supra. 
Such allegations should be directed to the trier of fact on the 
remaining Counts still pending below. 
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In sum, Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved persons" under the 
provisions of Section 73-3-14, and are not entitled to seek 
review of the State Engineer's decision. Plaintiffs do not own 
any water rights and do not even allege that the subject change 
would in any way interfere with other water rights. The fact 
that Plaintiffs believe the change will cause flood damage to 
their land does not make them aggrieved persons under the stat-
ute. The State Engineer does not and could not adjudicate 
Plaintiffs1 damage claims, and Plaintiffs1 area of concern does 
not fall within the "zone" or area to be protected by the statu-
tory change application process (which is limited to the protec-
tion of other water rights), and the granting of summary judgment 
was correct. 
POINT III: The Criteria Of Section 73-3-8 Do Not Apply 
To Chancre Applications Filed Pursuant To 
Section 73-3-3. 
Point II above demonstrates that the change application 
process is narrow in scope and Plaintiffs1 interests do not fall 
within the "zone" sought to be protected. In an attempt to get 
over that hurdle, Plaintiffs attempt to broaden the "zone of 
interest" by arguing that the broader criteria for the approval 
of new applications to appropriate water set forth in Section 73-
3-8 (specifically the criteria regarding the public welfare) also 
apply to change applications. That argument is without merit. 
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The language of Section 73-3-3, read in conjunction with 
related statutes in Title 73 Chapter 3, clearly demonstrates that 
the substantive criteria for the approval of change applications 
is limited to whether the proposed change would impair other 
vested water rights. This interpretation is further buttressed 
by the historical evolvement of Section 73-3-3, long-standing 
construction by the State Engineer in processing change applica-
tions, and the caselaw.11 
A. The Criteria for Approval of Change Applications is Limited 
to Those Contained in Section 73-3-3, 
On the face of the relevant statutes, it is clear that the 
substantive criteria for the approval or rejection of change 
applications is limited to the impairment of other water rights 
and is governed solely by Section 73-3-3. On the other hand, the 
broader criteria set forth in Section 73-3-8 are applicable only 
to new applications to appropriate water. 
Section 73-3-2 governs the filing of applications to ap-
propriate water, and sets forth the procedures for processing (as 
opposed to the substantive criteria for approving or rejecting) 
such applications. Section 73-3-8 sets forth the criteria for 
approval or rejection of applications to appropriate, and pro-
vides in relevant part: 
11. The amici on both sides of this case have focused 
primarily on this issue. The State Engineer concurs fully in the 
arguments set forth in the brief of Amici Water Users. 
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(1) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to 
approve an application if: (a) there is unappropriated 
water in the proposed source; (b) the proposed use will 
not impair existing rights or interfere with the more 
beneficial use of the water; (c) the proposed plan is 
physically and economically feasible, unless the 
application is filed by the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation, and would not prove detrimental to the 
public welfare; (d) the applicant has the financial 
ability to complete the proposed works; and (e) the 
application was filed in good faith and not for pur-
poses of speculation or monopoly. If the state en-
gineer, because of information in his possession 
obtained either by his own investigation or otherwise, 
has reason to believe that an application to approp-
riate water will interfere with its more beneficial use 
for irrigation, domestic or culinary, stock watering, 
power or mining development or manufacturing, or will 
unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural 
stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the 
public welfare, it is his duty to withhold his approval 
or rejection of the application until he has inves-
tigated the matter. If an application does not meet 
the requirements of this section, it shall be rejected. 
(2) An application to appropriate water for 
industrial, power, mining development, manufacturing 
purposes, agriculture, or municipal purposes may be 
approved for a specific and certain period from the 
time the water is placed to beneficial use under the 
application, . . . . (Emphasis added; see Appendix f!Alf 
for the full statute.) 
The statute is clearly and specifically cast in terms of applica-
tions to appropriate new water—not changes of existing rights. 
Section 73-3-3—on the other hand—deals exclusively with 
changes in point of diversion, place or nature of use of an 
existing right. It does not involve the appropriation of new 
water. Section 73-3-3 governs the change application process, 
and sets forth the specific criteria for their approval or 
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rejection. Section 73-3-3, in its 1985 format, provides in 
relevant part: 
Any person entitled to the use of water may change 
the place of diversion or use and may use the water for 
other purposes than those for which it was originally 
appropriated, but no such change may be made if it 
impairs any vested right without just compensation. 
. . Both permanent and temporary changes in point of 
diversion, place, or purpose of use of water including 
water involved in general adjudication or other suits, 
shall be made in the manner provided in this section. 
No permanent change shall be made except on the 
approval of an application therefor by the state engi-
neer. Such applications shall be made upon blanks to 
be furnished by the state engineer and shall set forth 
the name of the applicant, the quantity of water invol-
ved, the stream or source from which the appropriation 
has been made, the point on the stream or source where 
the water is diverted, the point to which it is pro-
posed to change the diversion of the water, the place, 
purpose and extent of the present use, and the place, 
purpose and extent of the proposed use and such other 
information as the state engineer may require. The 
procedure in the state engineer's office and rights and 
duties of the applicants with respect to applications 
for permanent changes of point of diversion, place or 
purpose of use shall be the same as provided in this 
title for applications to appropriate water; but the 
state engineer may, in connection with applications for 
permanent change involving only a change in point of 
diversion of 660 feet or less, waive the necessity for 
publishing notice of such applications . . . . 
Applications for either permanent or temporary 
changes shall not be rejected for the sole reason that 
such change would impair vested right of others, but 
if otherwise proper, they may be approved as to part of 
the water involved or upon the condition that such 
conflicting rights be acquired. (Emphasis added.)12 
12. As noted earlier, the 1986 and 1987 amendments to 
Section 73-3-3 did not change any of the substantive criteria 
relating to change applications. 
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The reference in Section 73-3-3 to the procedures in the State 
Engineer's Office regarding applications to appropriate is 
clearly a reference to the procedural steps in processing the 
application, such as assigning the application a file number, 
publication of notice, the filing of protests, etc. It does not 
purport to incorporate the substantive criteria of Section 73-3-8 
into Section 73-3-3. This is further buttressed by the portion 
of the Section which allows an exception from the normal proce-
dure for publishing notice where the change in point of diversion 
is less than 660 feet from the original point. Combining the two 
independent clauses into one sentence denotes a relationship 
between the two clauses. Thus, the publishing of notice is 
directly connected with the type of procedural references in this 
Section, and indicates the legislature's intent that only the 
procedural requirements were being addressed. 
Plaintiffs and amicus N.P.C.A. focus on the words "rights 
and duties of the applicant11 in Section 73-3-3 as demonstrating 
that something more than procedural requirements were intended. 
But the language regarding "rights and duties" applies to the 
applicant—not the State Engineer, and cannot be reasonably read 
to impose the criteria of Section 73-3-8 to change applications. 
Further, to apply all of the substantive criteria of Section 
73-3-8 to change applications does not make logical sense. For 
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example, Section 73-3-8 requires that before a new application to 
appropriate can be approved, the State Engineer must determine 
"that there is unappropriated water in the proposed source." A 
change application must be based on an already-existing right. 
It does not make sense to apply the "unappropriated water" 
criteria to change applications, since that question would have 
already been answered affirmatively in the granting of the right 
on which the change is based• To apply that criteria (i.e., the 
demonstration that unappropriated water exists) would mean that a 
water user on fully-appropriated systems such as the Provo or 
Sevier River drainages would never be able to change his point of 
diversion since the system is already fully appropriated. Other 
examples of inconsistencies in applying the criteria of Section 
73-3-8 to change applications are discussed in Point I.D. of the 
brief of Amici Water Users. 
B. The Legislative Evolution of Section 73-3-3 Supports 
Our Construction. 
The legislative evolution of Section 73-3-3 supports our 
position that only procedural criteria are to apply to the change 
application process—not additional substantive criteria. 
The change application statute was enacted in 1903 as part 
of the original Utah Water Code setting up the State Engineer's 
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Office (Utah R.S. 1898, Section 1276).13 The language of Section 
73-3-3 on which Plaintiffs rely was added as an amendment to the 
statute in 1937. For the sake of space, we will not set forth 
the full text of the statute before and after the 1937 amendment. 
Copies of the statute as it appeared in the 1919 Utah Revised 
Statutes, the 193 3 Utah Revised Statutes, and Utah Code Annotated 
1943 are set forth fully in Appendix flF".14 
Prior to the 1937 amendment, the change application statute 
(then Section 100-3-3, Utah Revised Statutes 1933) contained 
quite detailed procedural requirements for the processing of 
change applications, including expenses of publication of notice; 
the form, manner, place and time periods for publication of 
notice; the time, form, and filing of protests, etc. In the 1937 
amendment, all of those procedural criteria were deleted, and the 
present-day language was inserted, providing that the procedures 
for change applications were to be the same as for applications 
to appropriate. Thus, the present language in Section 73-3-3 was 
not adopted in a vacuum. It is clear that the legislature simply 
13. Amici Water Users discuss more fully the history and 
development of the State Engineer's administrative authority over 
the allocation of water resources, with which we fully concur. 
14. We would refer to Court to the more detailed analysis 
of the 1937 amendment set forth in the brief of Amici Water 
Users. 
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wanted to standardize the procedural requirements for all ap-
plications before the State Engineer relating to the filing of 
applications, notice, and protests. Nothing more was intended, 
and it is difficult to believe that the legislature would sig-
nificantly broaden the substantive change criteria in such an 
oblique manner.15 
In addition, the State Engineer's Office has never inter-
preted the criteria of Section 73-3-8 as applying to change 
applications. In approving or rejecting a change application, 
the State Engineer only considers whether other rights will be 
impaired. The State Engineer's disposition of the subject change 
application is fully consistent with this long-held interpreta-
tion of the applicable statutes. Long standing agency inter-
pretation or construction of statutes governing the agency are 
given great deference by the courts in determining legislative 
intent. See Colman v. State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 4 03 P.2d 
781 (1965); Wells Fargo Service Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 
626 P.2d 450 (Utah 1981); Concerned Parents of Step Children v. 
Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629 (Utah 1982); Hodges v. Western Piling & 
15. The only recent amendment which added any substantive 
criteria to the change application process was in 1986, when the 
legislature amended Section 7 3-3-3 to allow the Division of 
Wildlife Resources to file change applications on existing rights 
for instream fishery purposes (Laws of Utah 1986, Chapter 40, 
Section 1). However, those amendments are not relevant to the 
change application now before the Court. 
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Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986); and Red Lion Broadcasting 
Co. V. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). 
C. The Caselaw Supports Our Position that the Only Criteria 
for Approval or Rejection of a Change Application is 
Whether Other Rights will be Impaired. 
Numerous decisions of this Court and other courts throughout 
the West support the proposition that the only criteria for the 
approval or rejection of a change application is whether other 
water rights will be impaired. This is not, as amicus N.P.C.A. 
suggests, because the issue has never arisen in the past. It is 
a basic tenet of Western water law. 
The property right in the use of water includes the 
right to change the place, nature and means of use as 
well as the point of diversion. But the right to 
change is qualified and may not be exercised to the 
injury or substantial detriment of other appropriators 
. . .. Any injury must be to the water right and not 
to some other property right. (Clark, Waters and Water 
Rights, Section 412.2, p. 169 (1972); Emphasis added.) 
Another noted commentator has stated: 
To bar a proposed change of point of diversion of 
water, the injury that threatens to accrue must be to a 
water right . . . . The holder of a water right who 
cannot show injury thereto as a result of a proposed 
change in . . . point of diversion has no cause for 
complaint. Nor can one who can assert no legal right 
to the water complain of such a change. (Hutchins, 
Water Rights in the Nineteen Western States, Vol. 1, 
pp. 632-633, Misc. Pub. 1206, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 
(1971).) 
Throughout the history of Utah water law, the only criteria 
for approving or rejecting a change application has been whether 
the change will impair other vested water rights. It has been 
41 
held that so long as other water rights are not impaired, changes 
in existing rights contemplate a desirable result fully consis-
tent with progress, flexibility and change, and reflect the 
established policy of this arid State (American Fork Irr. Co. v. 
Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188 (1951)). Changes provide the 
flexibility to assure that the State's scarce water resources are 
put to their highest use. On the other hand, other water users 
are entitled to have stream or groundwater conditions exist as 
they did when they made their appropriations (Piute Res. & Irr. 
Co. v. West Pancruitch Irr. & Res. Co., 13 Utah 2d 6, 8, 3 67 P. 2d 
855 (1962); East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d 
170, 177, 271 P.2d 449 (1954); Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs 
Water Users Ass'n. 2 Utah 2d 141, 143, 270 P.2d 453 (1954); and 
United States v. Fourth District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132 
(1951), rehearing denied 121 Utah 18, 242 P.2d 774 (1952)). 
The only criteria the Utah courts have ever applied to 
change applications is whether the change would impair other 
water rights. This Court most recently stated that rule of law 
in Crafts v. Hansen, supra. We will not here repeat the lan-
guage from that case quoted ante at p. 19 of this brief, where 
this Court clearly stated that the only issue before the State 
Engineer (and the courts on appeal) on change applications is 
whether there is reason to believe the change can be made without 
impairing other rights. Further, the Court held that f!a change 
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application cannot be rejected without a showing that vested 
rights will . . . be substantially impaired11 (Crafts, 667 P.2d at 
1070). 
In Piute Res. & Irr. Co. v. West Pancruitch Irr. & Res. Co,, 
supra, this Court stated: 
The determining question is whether the storage of 
this winter water in the proposed reservoir will 
interfere with the established or vested rights of the 
protesting lower water users . . . . 
In United States v. Fourth District Court, supra, this Court 
held: 
[T]he district court in reviewing the engineer's 
decision also has no right to adjudicate the rights of 
the parties to the use of this water but can only 
determine whether there is reason to believe that some 
of this water can be rediverted and used as proposed by 
the application without impairing the rights of others. 
If it finds there is reason to so believe, the applica-
tion should be granted; otherwise it should be refused. 
But in any event, such approval would allow the change 
only to the extent that it can be made without impair-
ing the rights of others. (Emphasis added.) 
In Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users, supra, 
this Court again emphasized that a change application should be 
approved if there is no impairment of vested rights: 
If the evidence shows that there is reason to 
believe that the proposed change can be made without 
impairing vested rights the application should be 
approved . . . . A change application cannot be reject-
ed without a showing that vested rights will be im-
paired. While the applicant has the general burden of 
showing that no impairment of vested rights will result 
from the change, the person opposing such application 
must fail if the evidence does not disclose that his 
rights will be impaired. (Emphasis added.) 
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See also Lehmitz v. Utah Copper Company, 118 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 
1941). 
This concept is also clearly recognized in other Western 
States. In Re Application of Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. App. 
1988), dealt with nearly the identical issue now before this 
Court. In that case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated the 
issue as: 
Whether the applicable statutes allow consideration of 
the "public interest" in ruling on an application for 
change of purpose and place of use or point of diver-
sion. (760 P.2d at 788.) 
New Mexico had a statute governing new appropriations which, like 
Utah's Section 73-3-8, allowed the New Mexico State Engineer to 
consider the "public interest" in acting on new appropriations. 
The New Mexico change statute allowed changes "if such changes 
can be made without detriment to existing rights." The New 
Mexico Court held that the "public interest" criteria only 
applied to new appropriations and not to changes: 
Protestants argue that the second sentence quoted 
allows the state engineer to deny any application, 
including transfer of existing water rights, if it 
would be contrary to the public interest. Applicants 
contend that Section 72-5-7 applied only to applica-
tions to appropriate previously unappropriated surface 
water, and not to transfers of rights to waters already 
appropriated. We find Applicants1 argument persuasive. 
It is conceded that the state engineer has tradi-
tionally and consistently construed Section 72-5-7 to 
apply only to applications for unappropriated water, 
and that Sections 72-5-23 and -24 apply to transfers of 
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existing rights, and allow him to deny a proper ap-
plication for transfer only if it would be detrimental 
to other existing water rights. Long-standing ad-
ministrative constructions of statutes by the agency 
charged with administering them are to be given per-
suasive weight, and should not be lightly overturned. 
. . . [T]he more long-standing the state engineer's 
interpretation of construction of the statutes without 
amendment by the legislature, the more likely that the 
state enginer's interpretation reflects the legisla-
ture's intent. 
Case law also supports the state engineer's 
interpretation of the statute. "Inherent in a water 
right is the right to change the place of diverion, 
subject only to the requirement that the rights of 
other water users not be injured or impaired thereby." 
fid, at 791; Emphasis added.) 
The Court concluded: 
We will not distort the plain geography of a statutory 
scheme to find Protestants' construction. The statutes 
in force at the time of the Application did not allow 
denial of the requested transfer on the basis of the 
general "public interest" considerations. (Id. at 
791.)16 
The Sleeper decision is correct and clearly supports our position 
here. 
In Colthorpe v. Mountain Home Irr. Dist., 157 P.2d 1005 
(Ida. 1945), the Idaho Supreme Court held that in order to 
prevent a change in the point of diversion or nature of use of a 
water right, injury to another water right must be shown: 
The injury which appellant urges against the right 
of respondents to change the point of diversion and 
place of use of the Lockman water is not the kind of an 
16. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
August 2, 1988. 
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injury that will prevent the making of the change. To 
prevent a change in the point of diversion and place of 
use of water, the injury, if any, must be to a water 
right. (157 P.2d at 1008; Emphasis added.) 
In Re Johnson, 300 P. 492 (Ida. 1931), dealt with a situa-
tion where a water user sought to change his point of diversion 
so he would no longer convey his water through a canal he had 
historically used jointly with other water users. The other 
canal users protested, claiming the applicant's withdrawal from 
the ditch would place added expenses on the remaining users in 
the upkeep and maintenance of the canal. The Idaho Court reject-
ed those arguments, stating: 
The term "injured," as used in the sections of the 
statute referred to [citations omitted] applies to 
injury to the water right of another. It has no 
application to any damage or injury that may accrue to 
another growing out of the fact that he is a tenant in 
common of the same conduit with the owner of the water 
transferred. In other words, the proximate cause of 
the injury to appellant is not the change of point of 
diversion, or the place of use, but the failure of 
respondents to longer use the Soda canal in common with 
appellant. Such injury, if compensable in damages, is 
not cognizable in this proceeding, and does not prevent 
. . . change in the means of conveyance, point of 
diversion, or place of use. (300 P. at 494.) 
See also Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116 
(Colo. 1951); Longenecrger v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist. , 483 P.2d 297 
(N.M. 1971); Spaeth v. Emmett, 383 P.2d 812 (Mont. 1963); and 
Hollenbeck v. Granby Ditch Co., 420 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1966). 
The only authority Plaintiffs can cite for their strained 
reading of Sections 73-3-3 and 73-3-8 is a dissenting opinion by 
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Justice Wolfe in Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 
882 (1947). This is hardly persuasive authority in light of the 
numerous other clear holdings of this Court to the contrary. The 
statements by Justice Wolfe are even less persuasive since Movie 
dealt with the value to be placed on a water right in a condemna-
tion proceeding. It had nothing to do with a change application, 
and was not an appeal from a State Engineer's decision. Dicta 
from a dissenting opinion is pretty weak soup.17 
D. Any Change In The Criteria For The Approval Of Change 
Applications Must Come From The Legislature. 
As discussed above in this Point, the legislature has 
clearly provided that the only criteria for the approval or 
rejection of a change application is whether other water rights 
will be impaired. That rule has been consistently upheld by the 
courts. If there is to be any broadening of that criteria, it 
must come from the legislature. 
The hypotheticals raised by amicus N.P.C.A. (N.P.C.A. brief 
at pp. 9-10, 22-23) may make for an interesting policy discussion 
in a law school classroom, but they have no applicability here— 
nor do they support the proposition that the criteria of Section 
73-3-8 apply to change applications. N.P.C.A. obviously wishes 
17. Even if the public interest criteria were applicable, 
Plaintiffs here are alleging damage to their own private inter-
ests. Plaintiffs cannot equate their private interests to the 
"public interest." See, e.g., Great Salt Lake Minerals & Chemi-
cals Corp. v. Marsh, 596 F.Supp. 548, 558 (D. Utah 1984). 
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such were the case, but the legislature has provided otherwise.18 
If the approveil criteria for change applications is to be broad-
ened, such amendments must come from the legislature (see Dansie 
v. Lambert, 542 P.2d 742 (Utah 1975); Footnote 8, supra at p. 
21; and Northwest Datsun v. Oklahoma Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 
supra) • 
Amicus N.P.C.A. cites J.J.N.P. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 
1982) , for the proposition that the general public has an inter-
est in all waters of the State, and therefore the public in-
terest should be considered in considering change applications. 
J.J.N.P. does indeed stand for the proposition that the public 
has a right to use the natural waters of the State for recreation 
to the extent they are in a natural watercourse. However, 
Section 73-1-1 states that the public ownership of water resour-
ces is "subject to all existing rights to the use thereof"; and 
this Court in J.J.N.P. so noted. J.J.N.P. does not stand for the 
proposition that the publicfs right to use water for recreational 
purposes overrides existing legally-acquired rights to divert 
that water and place it to beneficial use. The holding of 
J.J.N.P. cannot logically be relied on to say that the public 
18. The example of Amicus N.P.C.A. regarding Zion National 
Park does not detract from our position. Those changes have been 
protested by the National Park Service on the grounds that the 
changes will impair its reserved water rights in the Virgin River 
within the Pcirk, and the change process is available to address 
that claimed impairment. 
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interest is to be considered in acting on change applications 
where the legislature has not provided otherwise. 
In conclusion, the criteria for the approval of change 
applications is governed exclusively by Section 73-3-3, and the 
broader criteria of Section 73-3-8 apply only to applications to 
appropriate and are inapplicable to the change application here. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court properly granted the State Engineer's motion 
for summary judgment and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of December, 1988. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
73-3-3. Change of place of diversion or use — Right to — 
Permanent or temporary — Application — Contents — Investiga-
tion — Notice and hearing — Deposit to cover expenses — 
Finality of decision — Violation as misdemeanor — Exception as 
to replacement wells. Any person entitled to the use of water 
may change the place of diversion or use and may use the water 
for other purposes than those for which it was originally ap-
propriated, but no such change shall be made if it impairs any 
vested right without just compensation. Such changes may be 
permanent or temporary. Changes for an indefinite length of time 
with an intention to relinquish the original point of diversion, 
place or purpose of use are defined as permanent changes. 
Temporary changes include and are limited to all changes for 
definitely fixed periods of not exceeding one year. Both per-
manent and temporary changes of point of diversion, place or 
purpose of use of water including water involved in general 
adjudication or other suits, shall be made in the manner provided 
herein and not otherwise. 
No permanent change shall be made except on the approval of 
an application therefor by the state engineer. Such applications 
shall be made upon blanks to be furnished by the state engineer 
and shall set forth the name of the applicant, the quantity of 
water involved, the stream or source from which the appropriation 
has been made, the point on the stream or source where the water 
is diverted, the point to which it is proposed to change the 
diversion of the water, the place, purpose and extent of the 
present use, and the place, purpose and extent of the proposed 
use and such other information as the state engineer may require. 
The procedure in the state engineer's office and rights and 
duties of the applicants with respect to applications for per-
manent changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use 
shall be the same as provided in this title for applications to 
appropriate water; but the state engineer may, in connection with 
applications for permanent change involving only a change in 
point of diversion of 660 feet or less, waive the necessity for 
publishing notice of such applications. No temporary change 
shall be made except upon an application filed in duplicate with 
the state engineer upon forms to be provided by him, which shall 
set forth the name of the water user, a description of his water 
right, the nature and time of the change sought, the reason for 
the change, and such other information as the state engineer may 
require. The state engineer shall make an investigation and if 
such temporary change does not impair any vested rights of others 
he shall make an order authorizing the change. If he shall find 
that the change sought might impair such rights he shall give 
notice of the application to all persons whose rights may be 
affected thereby and shall give them an opportunity to be heard 
before authorizing the change. Such notice may be given by 
regular mail five days before the hearing or by one publication 
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the 
original point of diversion or place of use is located five days 
before such hearing. Before making an investigation or giving 
notice the state engineer may require the applicant to deposit a 
sum of money sufficient to pay the expenses thereof. 
Applications for either permanent or temporary changes shall 
not be rejected for the sole reason that such change would impair 
vested right of others, but if otherwise proper, they may be 
approved as to part of the water involved or upon condition that 
such conflicting rights be acquired. 
Any person holding an approved application for the appro-
priation of water may in like manner, either permanently or 
temporarily change the point of diversion, place or purpose of 
use, but no such change of approved application shall affect the 
priority of the original application; provided, that no change of 
point of diversion, place or nature of use set forth in an 
approved application shall operate to enlarge the time within 
which the construction of work shall begin or be completed. The 
determination of the state engineer shall be final, unless an 
action to review his decision is filed within the time and in the 
manner provided by section 73-3-14. 
Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of 
diversion, place or purpose of use, either permanently or tem-
porarily without first applying to the state engineer in the 
manner herein provided, shall obtain no right thereby and shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, each day of such unlawful change 
constituting a separate offense, separately punishable. 
The provisions of this section shall not apply to the 
replacement of an existing well by a new well drilled within a 
radius of 150 feet from the point of diversion from said existing 
well, and no such replacement well shall be drilled except upon 
compliance with the requirements of section 73-3-28. 
73-3-8. Approval or rejection of application — Require-
ments for approval — Application for specified period of time — 
Filing of royalty contract for removal of salt or minerals. 
(1) It shall be the duty of the state engineer to approve 
an application if: (a) there is unappropriated water in the 
proposed source; (b) the proposed use will not impair existing 
rights or interfere with the more beneficial use of the water; 
(c) the proposed plan is physically and economically feasible, 
unless the application is filed by the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation, and would not prove detrimental to the public 
welfare; (d) the applicant has the financial ability to complete 
the proposed works; and (e) the application was filed in good 
faith and not for purposes of speculation or monopoly. If the 
state engineer, because of information in his possession obtained 
either by his own investigation or otherwise, has reason to 
believe that an application to appropriate water will interfere 
with its more beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culi-
nary, stock watering, power or mining development or manufactur-
ing, or will unreasonably affect public recreation or the natural 
stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the public 
welfare, it is his duty to withhold his approval or rejection of 
the application until he has investigated the matter. If an 
application does not meet the requirements of this section, it 
shall be rejected. 
(2) An application to appropriate water for industrial, 
power, mining development, manufacturing purposes, agriculture, 
or municipal purposes may be approved for a specific and certain 
period from the time the water is placed to beneficial use under 
the application, but in no event may an application be granted 
for a period of time less than that ordinarily needed to satisfy 
the essential and primary purpose of the application or until the 
water is no longer available as determined by the state engineer. 
At the expiration of the period fixed by the state engineer the 
water shall revert to the public and is subject to appropriation 
as provided by Title 73. The state engineer may extend any 
limited water right upon a showing that the essential purpose of 
the original application has not been satisfied, that the need 
for an extension is not the result of any default or neglect by 
the applicant, and that water is still available; except no 
extension shall exceed the time necessary to satisfy the primary 
purpose of the original application. A request for extension 
must be filed in writing in the office of the state engineer not 
later than 60 days before the expiration date of the application. 
(3) Before the approval of any application for the ap-
propriations of water from navigable lakes or streams of the 
state which contemplates the recovery of salts and other minerals 
therefrom by precipitation or otherwise, the applicant shall file 
with the state engineer a copy of a contract for the payment of 
royalties to the state of Utah. The approval of an application 
shall be revoked in the event of the failure of the applicant to 
comply with terms of his royalty contract. 
73-3-14. Review by courts of engineer's decisions. In any 
case where a decision of the state engineer is involved any 
person aggrieved by such decision may within sixty days after 
notice thereof bring a civil action in the district court for a 
plenary review thereof. The state engineer shall give notice of 
his decision by mailing a copy thereof by regular mail to the 
applicant and to each protestant and notice shall be deemed to 
have been given on the date of mailing. The place of trial, 
subject to the power of the court to change the same as provided 
by lawf shall be in the county in which the stream or water 
source, or some part thereof, is located. The state engineer 
must be joined as a defendant in all suits to review his deci-
sions, but no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation 
shall be rendered against him. Parties shall be served with 
process as in other cases and notice of the pendency of such 
action shall be filed by the clerk of the district court with the 
state engineer within twenty days after the same is commenced 
which shall operate to stay all further proceedings pending the 
decision of the district court. 
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) MEMORANDUM DEC 
NUMBER 57-3411 (al3077) ) 
Change Application Number 57-3411 (al3077) was filed by the 
Draper Irrigation Company and the Salt Lake County Water Conser-
vancy District to change the point of diversion, place and nature 
of use of water rights as evidenced by Decree £3429, 57-3411 
(D47), and 57-443 (A13830), titled in the name of the Draper Ir-
rigation Company; the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
being entitled to the use of portions of said water rights by 
virtue of an agreement entered into with the Draper Irrigation 
Company. 
It was proposed to change one-half of the entire flow of water in 
Dell Canyon (North Dry Creek), all the waters of Middle and South 
Forks Cry Creek, all but 0.18 cfs. of Rocky Mouth and Big Willow 
Creeks, and 1-4 cfs, of water saved as described in water user 
claim 57-4 4 3 from the same sources as described above. 
Water has been diverted at points as follows: North Dry Creek-
North 17o 10f East 5020 feet, Middle Fork Dry Creek- North 23o 
10" East 2420 feet, South Fork Dry Creek- North 77o 10' East 2020 
feet, Big Willow Creek- South 33o 10f West 5055 feet, and Rocky 
Mouth Creek- South 39o 15f West 3915 feet, all from the NE 
Corner, Section 23, T3S, R1E, SLB&M, and 9,559.5 acre-feet of 
water has been used from January 1 to December for domestic, 
municipal, storage, industrial, and stockwatering purposes, and 
from April 1 to September 30 for the irrigation of 2716 acres. 
All water uses were within sections 7, 8, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, and 36, T3S, R1E, SLB&M, and sections 
4, 5, and 6, T4S, R1E, SLB&M. 
It was proposed to divert 9,559.5 acre-feet of water from the 
same sources with flow rates as heretofore, to be diverted from 
points as follows: North Dry Creek- South 750 feet and East 4121 
feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 14, Middle Fork Dry Creek-
South 2783 feet East 3225 feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 14, 
South Fork Dry Creek- North 3 06 feet and East 992 feet from the 
Sl/4 Corner, Section 14, Big Willow Creek- South 2609 feet and 
West 853 feet from the Nl/4 Corner, Section 23, and Rocky Mouth 
Creek- South 2389 feet and West 493 feet from the Nl/4 Corner, 
Section 23, all T3S, R1E, SLB&M. 
The portion of the water to be used by'the Draper Irrigation Com-
pany would be for the period from January 1, to December 31, and 
would include domestic, stockwatering, commercial, fire protec-
tion, and other purposes incidental to the requirements of Draper 
City, which would be provided both raw water from the mountain 
streams herein described, and treated water from the Draper 
Treatment Plant, which is operated by the Company. The Company 
would also irrigate 1790.7 acres from April 1 to September 30. 
All Company uses to be within the same area as described hereto-
fore, together with uses in sections 25, 26, 36, T3S, RIW, S L 3 & M n n a p q n 
and Section 1. T4S. RIW. ST.R^M U U U U W U 
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The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District proposed to use 
water following treatment at itfs Southeast Regional Water Treat-
ment Plant, from January 1, to December 31 for municipal purposes 
within the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Districts bound-
aries. The change application was advertised in the Deseret News 
from June 28, 1984 through July 12, 1984, and was protested by 
Stanley B. Donham. 
A hearing was held in Salt Lake City on February 26, 1985 and was 
attended by the applicants representatives, and the protestant 
with his representatives. At the hearing the applicants stated 
that Draper Irrigation Company had a contract with Salt Lake 
County Water Conservancy District which allowed the District to 
utilize portions of the Company's water for municipal purposes, 
following treatment at the District's treatment plant, and that 
the subject change application had been precipitated by this con-
tractual agreement. 
The protestant stated that as a result of the project construc-
tion, his property was flooded in 1983 and 1984 causing extensive 
property damage, and that the now-completed project was con-
structed such that further flooding of this property could occur 
in the future due to project maintenance, or for other causes at 
the option of the District. He further stated that the District 
had not obtained permits allowing them to discharge water from 
their system, and that the project as constructed was detrimental 
to the public welfare. 
In an effort to gain additional information relative to this mat-
ter, the State Engineer's Staff conducted a field review on May 
7, 1985. Representatives of both the applicant and protestant 
were present for the review, which included observations of al-
leged damage to the protestant1s property, along with observa-
tions of the District's construction which took place in connec-
tion with temporary water rights change applications approved by 
the State Engineer. 
In a review of the foregoing, the State Engineer concludes that: 
1. He is without authority relative to damages which may have 
been sustained in connection with project construction 
which occurred as a result of his reaction to water right 
applications; therefore, this issue does not apply to 
this change application. 
2. The State Engineer is not in receipt of evidence indicat-
ing that existing water rights will be impaired if this 
change application is implemented. 
In consideration of these conclusions, it is the opinion of the 
State Engineer that this application can be approved. p 
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This decision is subject to the provisions of Section 73-3-14, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for plenary review by 
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court 
within sixty days from the date hereof. 
Dated this 26th day of December 1985. 
Robert L. Morgan, £<T., State Engineer 
RLM:EDF:laz 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 2 6th day 
of December, 1985 to: 
Draper Irrigation Co. 
2582 South 950 East 
Draper, UT 84020 
Salt Lake Water Cons. Dist. 
P.O. Box 15618 
3495 South 300 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 85115 
Stanley B. Bonham 
10741 Dimple Del Road 
Sandy, UT 84092 
James A. Mcintosh 
James A. Mcintosh and Assoc. 
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. So. 
1399 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
D. Brent Rose 
% Clyde & Pratt 
2 00 American Savings Plaza 
77 West Second South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Lee Kapaloski 
% Kapaloski, Kinghorn & Peters 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake^City, UT 84111 
BY: //)flS,4,P /? 2 w > < g 
^-t^irel A. Zunael,^Secretary 
n n n n Q ? . 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
FILMED 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M. 
BONHAM, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State 
Engineer, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-86-1341 
The Court has reviewed the file, pleadings, Memoranda, and 
listened to oral argument of counsel after which the Court took 
the defendant Utah State Engineerfs Motion for Summary Judgment 
under advisement. 
Plaintiffs1 counsel has raised several important issues. He 
has suggested a more liberal interpretation of the following: of 
"aggrieved person" under Section 73-3-14, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as 
amended; construction of the term "zone of interest" and its 
applicability to this case; the Engineer's duties and 
responsibilities under Section 78-3-8, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as 
amended; and application of permanent change under Section 73-3-
3. 
This Court, however, cannot agree with plaintiffs1 
contentions. 
The Court is of the opinion defendant State Engineer!s 
position is the correct one. As they have succinctly stated, 
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"•..the change application process is narrow in scope, is covered 
exclusively by Section 73-3-3, and the only issue before the 
State Engineer and this Court on appeal is whether there is 
reason to believe that the change could be accomplished without 
impairing other vested water rights. The plaintiffs are not 
users and have no water rights to be impaired by the subject 
change; they therefore are not aggrieved parties under Section 
73-3-14. The concerns they raise are simply outside the limited 
criteria which govern the approval and rejection of change 
applications,," 
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Count I. Defendant is to prepare Judgment 
pursuant to this decision. 
Dated this _day of December, 1987. 
RAYMOND S. UNOv 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, 
following, this *T day of December, 1987: 
James A. Mcintosh, Esq. 
1399 South 700 East, Suite 14 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Ken J. Hagen, E£q. 
P.O. Box 15618 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Lee K. Kapaloski, Esq. 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael M. Quealy 
Assistant Attorney General 
1636 W. North Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
noG-
t-: v 
I l ***r 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
, MAR l H 1988 
Kouco'» h'nO'er! GKrff. 3«3 Oitt Court Cn 
i 'S^epoiy Ciferk. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, No. 3472 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DALLIN W. JENSEN, No. 1669 
Solicitor General 
MICHAEL M. QUEALY, No. 2667 
Assistant Attorney General 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116 
Telephone: (801) 533-4446 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY B. BONHAM and ANNE M. 
BONHAM; BOYD F. SUMMERHAYS and 
ARLEEN M. SUMMERHAYS, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs, ) EXPRESSLY DIRECTING 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b) 
ROBERT L. MORGAN, Utah State 
Engineer; SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah 
and a body corporate? and DRAPER 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah ) Civil No. C-86-1341 
corporation, 
(Judge Raymond S. Uno) 
Defendants. 
Defendant Utah State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on Count I of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint came before 
the Court for hearing on November 20, 1987. Further conferences 
were held between the Court and counsel by telephone on November 
30, 1987 and December 7, 1987. Plaintiffs are represented by 
James A. Mcintosh. Defendant Utah State Engineer is represented 
by Dallin W. Jensen and Michael M. Quealy. Defendants Draper 
-fC-Q 
Irrigation Company and Salt Lake County Water Conservancy Dis-
trict are represented by Lee E. Kapaloski and LeRoy S. Axland, 
respectively. 
The Court having reviewed the file, including the affidavits 
and memoranda of counsel submitted on the present motion; having 
heard and considered the arguments of counsel, and the Court 
being fully advised in this matter concludes that the change ap-
plication process under Section 73-3-3 U.C.A. is narrow in scope; 
that the issues raised by Plaintiffs are outside the limited 
criteria governing the approval and rejection of change applica-
tions; and that Plaintiffs are not "aggrieved persons" within the 
meaning of Section 73-3-14 U.C.A.. The Court therefore grants 
the Motion of Defendant Utah State Engineer for Summary Judgment. 
Further, the Court has indicated orally in explaining its ruling 
to counsel that while Plaintiffs are not entitled to bring an 
action to review the Decision of the State Engineer, their pro-
test and participation before the State Engineer has placed De-
fendants Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and Draper 
Irrigation Company on notice of Plaintiffs1 concerns, so as to 
preserve Plaintiffs1 claim for punitive damages as pleaded else-
where in the Second Amended Complaint. 
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that 
Defendant State Engineer's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and is 
hereby granted, and that judgment is hereby entered against 
Plaintiffs, dismissing with prejudice Count I of Plaintiffs1 
Second Amended Complaint, which is the only Count therein 
directed at the State Engineer. This judgment does not affect 
the allegations against the other Defendants as set forth in 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint. 
The Court hereby expressly determines that there is no just 
reason for delay and hereby expressly directs that this judgment 
be entered as a final judgment within the meaning of Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Each party shall bear its own costs. 
DATED this /Y" day of PcVnrM-y, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
RAYMOND S. UNO 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the forego-
ing proposed JUDGMENT AND ORDER EXPRESSLY DIRECTING ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b), was served by mailing the same, 
first class postage prepaid, this 4th day of February, 1988, to: 
James A. Mcintosh 
Attorney at Law 
Intrade Building South #14 
1399 South 700 East 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84105 
LeRoy S. Axland 
Attorney at Law 
175 South West Temple 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Lee E. Kapaloski 
Attorney at Law 
185 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11898 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147 
MICHAEL M. QraAI^X 
Assistant Attorney G 
APPENDIX "D 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, No. 3472 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DALLIN K. JENSEN, No. 1669 
Solicitor General 
MICHAEL M. QUEALY, No. 2667 
Assistant Attorney General 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
SALT LAKE CITY DT 84116 
Te1eDhone: (801) 533-4446 ___ 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY B. BONHAK and ANNE K. ) 
BONHAK, BOYD F. SUMMERHAYS, AND ) 
ARLEEN K. SUMMERHAYS, ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) KENT JONES 
Plaintiffs, ) 
v.. ) 
R03ERT L. MORGAN, Utah State ) 
Engineer, SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER ) 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, £ Political ) 
Subdivision of the Stare of Utah ) 
and a Body Corporate, and DRAPER ) 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Utah ) Civil No. C-86-1341 
Corporation, ) 
) (Judge Raymond S. Uno) 
Defendants. ) 
Kent Jones, being first duly swcm upon oath, deposes and 
says that: 
1. I reside at 6866 South 2350 West in "West Jordan, Utah. 
2. I am currently employed by the State of Utah, Division of 
Water Rights, otherwise known as the Utah State Engineer's 
Office. 
3. Within the Division of Kater Rights I hold the position 
of Directing Engineer in charge of the Distribution Section. 
Part of the responsibility of the Distribution Section is to keep 
accurate records of all owners of water rights in the State of 
Utah. 
4. At the request of the Utah Attorney General's Officef I 
had a search of this Office's records conducted under my direct 
supervision to determine what, if any, water rights are owned in 
Salt Lake County by any of the named Plantiffs* in the above-
captioned action* 
5. A detailed search of our records failed to show any 
ownership of water rights in Salt Lake County by any of *the named 
Plaintiffs in the above-captioned action. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 19B7. 
KENT JOKES sj 
STATS 0? UTAH ) 
)ss. 
COUKTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Subscribed and sworn "to before me this 4-th dey of September, 
1987. t 
Residing at: Notary Puclac \ 
r-Zc-Py pC/y O^y^ //^M #y Commission Expires :SL, 
/ 'V 
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\ V vi&t* Court of 
Noorun 
Court 
Robert J. DeBry ("DeBry") filed a petition in this court 
seeking direct appellate review of a final order of the Salt 
Lake County Board of Appeals ("Board*). We dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
DeBry proceeds from the premise that a direct "appeal- to 
some court of this state from a final order of a local 
governmental agency is an inherent right. However, the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the district court's 
appellate jurisdiction must be provided by statute. Utah 
Const, art. VIII, § 5. Because there is no constitutional or 
other statutory provision creating a right to judicial 
review—in either court—of final orders of local 
administrative agencies such as the Board,1 DeBry contends 
our general jurisdictional statute must be interpreted as the 
statutory: grant of a right of direct "appeal" to this court. 
We do not' agree. 
At the time DeBry's petition was filed, that statute 
provided: "The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
• . . over: (a) the final orders and decrees of state and 
1. £1^ Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 ("Except for matters filed 
originally with the supreme court, there shall be in all cases 
an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a 
court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause."). 
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local agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
them . . . .- Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1987).2 This 
general statute defines the outermost limits of our appellate 
jurisdiction, allowing us to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review. See 
State ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Manfre, 102 N.M. 241, 
693 P.2d 1273, 1275 (Ct. App. 1984). It is not a catchall 
provision authorizing us to review the orders of every 
administrative agency for which there is no statute 
specifically creating a right to judicial review. In the 
absence of such a specific statute, we have no jurisdiction.3 
2. The statute was recently amended by 1988 Utah Laws, ch. 73, 
§ 1 (effective April 25, 1988). It now reads, in pertinent 
part: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction . . . over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees 
resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies . . . ; 
(b) appeals from the district 
court review of adjudicative 
proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other 
local agencies!.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (1988). 
3. Our determination that this court has no jurisdiction in 
this case does not leave parties without a remedy for arbitrary 
-or unlawful local agency action where there is no statute 
specifically authorizing judicial review. See, e.g., Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(b)(2); Davis County v. Clearfield Citv, 756 P.2d 
704, 707 (Utah App. 1988) (where there is no specific, 
statutorily prescribed method for judicial review of city 
council action, review is available by •'traditional means" of 
extraordinary writ). See also Whiting v. Clayton, 617 P.2d 362 
(Utah 1980); Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 
555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976). 
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DeBry's petition is therefore dismissed. 
Normal H. Jackson, ^t^ dge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
£ A A ^ ^ C ^ ^ O 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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fcrrttrto constitute an abandonment erf w a -
Promontory B- Co. T. ATFile, 28 TJ. 398; 79 P. 
<7. 
Becker T. Marble Cr. lrr. Co., IB TJ. 225; 49 
P. S91. 111S. 
Non-uaer tor seven year* doe* not constitute 
abandonment. 
Id. 
Where one who hat developed water Ine4-
dentally, in dlgpino a tunnel on his own land, 
turns rt lnu> a stream, be does not thereby 
abandon it. but may take It out apsln lower 
down the natural stream, with a proper allow-
ance lor a«epare and eTaporation. 
Herriman lrr. Co. T. S.eel, 25 TJ. 96; 69 P. 
71*. 
MBS. (128&x24.) Place of Aversion may be changed Vested right* 
protected Any person, corporation, or association entitled to the use of 
water may change the place of diversion, and may use the water for other 
purposes than those for which it was originally appropriated, but no such 
cb2Dge shall be made, if it impairs any vested right, without just compen-
sation; no change of point of diversion or purpose of use shall be made ex-
cept on the approval of an application of the owner by the state engineer. 
Beiore the approval of an application the stare engineer must, at the expense 
o? the applicant, to be paid in advance, give notice thereof by publication 
22 some newspaper, having general circulation within the boundaries of the 
rirer system or water source in which the point of diversion of the water 
is located; such notice shall give the name of the applicant, the quantity of 
water involved, the stream or source from which the appropriation has been 
made,-the point on the stream or source where the water is diverted, the 
point to which it is proposed to change the diversion of the water; the place, 
pcrpose, and extent of present use, and the place, purpose, and extent of the 
proposed use. Said ootice shall be published at least once a week for a pe-
riod of thirry days. Any person, corporation, or association interesTed may, 
xl any rime within thirty days after the completion of the' publication of 
aid notice, nie with the state engineer a protest against the granting of 
aid application for change of point of diversion or purpose of use, stating 
tbe reasons therefor, winch shall be duly considered by the state engineer, 
WHO shall approve or reject said application for change of point of diversion or 
psrpose of use. Such application shall not be rejected solely for the rea-
SOn
- ^t.su^ ^f^gg would impair vested rights of others, but the appli-
cation, n otherwise proper, maywbe approved conditionally upon such con-
&cnng rights being acquired. The determination of the state engineer 
* ^ be final unless appeal is taken to the district court of the county in 
*nicx t^iie point of the diversion of water is situated, within sixty days of no-
R. S. 98, § 1276; '03, p. 102; '05, p. 162; am'd '09, p. 90. 
^ a ^ f c S y , corporations icrbidden to e x -
« * * itock. § X3B1, exception in Xavcr of r a £ -
*•£» c o r s l e t . § :m. 
IJ?Tf* L' ^ C T i o r may be changed, if it does 
t / t ? 1 1 * 1 * ^ ^ otaer Tested n ^ h t a 
o e c r
« e o r i e m n x epen a power company 
a »ecoiidary use of the water oi a rrver BO long-
as the former appropriator •4chal) continue to 
divert it£ water at its present point of cjver-
aion. and to u*e ine t o e at its present 
place of use," is effective, taoujrh ruci: l o n n e r 
s.ppropnatcr has the a jr i t to cn?nre Its pia.ee 
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br the state engineer, and shall set forth the 
Bxn>e and post-office address of the person, 
poration or association making the application 
the nature of the proposed use for which-the J 
propriation is intended; the quantity of watej 
acre feet or the flow of water in second fejft to 
be appropriated, and the time during whjfch it 
is to be used each year; the name of the 
or other source from which the water is \A be di-
verted; the place on such stream or source where 
the water is to be diverted and the nat^e of the 
diverting works; the dimensions, gT/de, shape 
jad nature of the proposed diverting channel; 
md such other facts as will clear}/ define the 
lull purpose of the proposed appropriation. If 
the proposed use is for irrigation, Jme application 
*haU show the legal subdivisions ii the land pro-
posed to be irrigated, with *£Jt total acreage 
thereof and the character o f / h e soil. If the 
proposed use is for developing power, the appli-
cation shall show the nuxnbe/, size and kind of 
irater wheels to be employed/and the head under 
which each wheel is to be /perated; the amount 
of power to be produced And the purposes for 
*hich and the places whe/e it is to be used; also, 
the point where the wa/er is to be returned to 
the natural stream orAource. If the proposed 
nse is for milling or npring, the application shall 
sbofr the name of th/mill and its location or the 
name of the mine And the mining district in 
?rhich it is situat/d, its nature, and the place 
Trhere the water ig to be returned to the natural 
stream or sourcZ The place of diversion and 
place of retura/>f the water shall be designated 
with reference/to the United States survey cor-
ners or min«*al monuments, when either the 
point of divZ-sion or the point of return is sit-
uated withp six miles of the nearest United 
States suorey corner. The storage of water by 
means of/ reservoir shall be regarded as a diver-
sion, an/ the points of diversion in such cases 
shall b / deemed to include the point where the 
taken from the stream and the center of 
the impounding dam of the reservoir; The lands 
inundated by any reservoir shall be de-
d as nearly as may be, and by government 
fodivisions, if upon surveyed land, and the area 
(i the surface thereof when the reservoir is filled 
'ihall be given. (L. 19, p. 177, § 42.) 
approval of any such application the state engi-
neer must, at the expense of the applicant to be 
paid in advance, give notice thereof by publica-
tion in some newspaper having general circula-
tion within the boundaries of the river system 
or near the water source in which the point of 
diversion of the water iB located; such notice 
shall give the name of the applicant, the quan-
tity of water involved, the stream or source from 
which the appropriation has been made, the point 
on the stream or source where the water is di-
verted, the point to which it is proposed to change 
the diversion of the water, the place, purpose and 
extent of the present use, and the place, purpose 
and extent of the proposed use. Said notice 
shall be published at least once a week for a 
period of four weeks. Any person interested 
may, at any time within thirty days after the 
last publication of said notice, fOe with the state 
engineer a protest against the granting of the ap-
plication, stating the reasons therefor, which 
shall be duly considered by the state engineer, 
and he shall approve or reject the application for 
change of point of diversion, place or purpose of 
use. Such application shall not be rejected for 
Ithe sole reason that such change would impair 
[vested rights of others, but if otherwise proper, 
it may be approved upon condition that such con-
flicting rights be acquired. The determination of 
[the state engineer shall be final unless contested 
jin court within sixty days after written notice to 
[the applicant of the action of the state engineer. 
[Any person holding an approved application for 
{the appropriation of water may in like manner 
change the point of diversion, place or purpose 
use. * (L. 19, p. 177, § 8.), 
10G-4-3. Change of Place of Diversion or Use 
—Notice—Contest—Limitation of Ac-
tion. 
Any person entitled to the use of water may 
change the place of diversion or use, and may use 
the water for other purposes than those for which 
fc was originally appropriated, but no such 
change shall be made, if it impairs any vested 
right, without just compensation; no change of 
point of diversion, piace or purpose of use shall 
be nade except on the approval of an application 
of the owner by the state engineer. Before the 
uur* «f Pnn>o«t (Decioed prior to 1S19)—Curamt taty not 
k appropriate wjtter io- oi»e pcrpoM xad "UKX a.ppjy it or 
\ any pzrt of it to another ptE-po*c BIT Gocurewood Tai>-
V e r thick Co. v. Sbrrtli±^ 1W ? . Shi, 49 TJ. SfcS. 
lOG-^V deceived," TOed" Defined. 
WneneNer in this title the word "received" 
is used witfc reference to any paper deposited in 
[the office of\he state engineer, it shall be deemed 
fto mean the \a te when such paper was first 
deposited in tne state engineer's office; and 
[whenever the tern "filed" is used, it shall be 
[deemed to mean tnk date when such paper was 
•{acceptably completeinin form and substance and 
[filed in said office, \ (L. 19, p. 177, § 44.) 
100-S-5. Action by Engineer on Applications 
—Procedure. \ 
On receipt of each application it shall be the 
duty of the state engineer to Viake an indorse-
ment thereon of the date of itsWceipt, and to 
make a record of such receipt in \ book kept in 
his office for that purpose. It shaDsi>e his duty 
to examine the application and ascertain if it 
sets forth all the above rec;iirec fact^ and if. 
not, it shall be returned to the applicant within 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1 9 4 3 
[443] Title 100—Water and Irrigation 100-3-3 
filing in office of state engineer as pro-
vided by this section. See Clark v. 
North Cottonwood Irrigation &, Water 
Co. of Farmington, 79 U. <25, 437, 11 
P.2d 300. 
The filing: of an application in state 
engineer's office gives applicant an in-
complete or inchoate right which he 
may defend in a court of law. Tanner 
v. Provo Reservoir Co., 78 U. 158, 170, 
2 P-2d 107, following Robinson v. 
Schoenfeld, 62 TJ. 233, 218 P. 1041. 
The filing of application with Efc*te 
engineer, as required by statut^^ooes 
not establish appropriation^*! water. 
Sowards v. Meagher, 37>8; 212, 223, 
108 P. 1112. 
i. Propriety oL^proposed nse.* 
Under thj^section, an appropriation 
of water^eJmnot be made for the irriga-
tion ^pi^unsnrveyed, unindosed, and un-
occupied public domain of the TJr 
States for the sole production frf^iood 
for wild water fowl, since urefiect a 
valid appropriation of w ^ r the bene-
ficial use must be onelfclt inures to the 
exclusive benefit .pr the appropriator 
subject to his^*6*mp]ete control. Lake 
Shore Duck/Ciub v. Lake View Duck 
Club. 50/tL 76, 166 P. 309, L. R. A. 
1918^620, applying Comp. Laws 1907, 
88x6, as amended by Laws 1915, 
Dh. 83. 
As against a contention that water in 
question could not be diverted above 
riparian owner's land because he has 
right in the water of said creek for 
power to operate his oxygen plant, such 
right is satisfied when the water re-
enters the creek at the tailrace of his 
oxygen plant. Whitmore v. Salt Lake 
City, 89 U. 3S7, 399, 57 P.2d 726. 
100-3-3. Change of Place of Diversion or Use—Application—Notice— 
Protests. 
Any person entitled to the use of water may change the place of di-
version or use and may use the water for other purposes than those 
for which it was originally appropriated, but no such change shall be 
made if it impairs any vested right without just compensation. Such 
changes may be permanent or temporary. Changes for an indefinite 
length of time with an intention to relinquish the original point of 
diversion, place or purpose of use are denned as permanent changes. 
Temporary changes include and are limited to all changes for def-
initely fixed periods of not exceeding one year. Both permanent and 
temporary changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use 
of water including water involved in general adjudication or other 
suits, shall be made in the manner provided herein and not otherwise. 
No permanent change shall be made except on the approval of an 
application therefor by the state engineer. Such applications shall 
be made upon blanks to be furnished by the state engineer and shall 
set forth the.jname of the applicant, the quantity of water involved, 
the stream or Source from which the appropriation has been made, the 
point on the stream or source where the water is diverted, the point to 
which it is proposed to change the diversion of the water, the place, 
purpose and extent of the present use, and the place, purpose and extent 
of the proposed use and such other information as the sxate engineer 
may require. The procedure in the state engineer's office and the rights 
and duties of the applicant with respect to applications for permanent 
changes of point of diversion, place or purpose of use shall be the same 
as provided in this title for applications to appropriate water. 
No temporary change shall be made, except upon an application filed 
in duplicate with the state engineer upon forms to be provided by 
him, which shall set forth the name of the water user, a description 
of his water right, the nature and time of the change sought, the 
reason for the change, and such other information as the state engi-
neer may require. The state engineer shall make an investigation and 
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if Buch temporary change does not impair any vested rights of others he 
shall make an order authorizing the change. If he shall find that 
the change sought might impair such rights he shall give notice of the 
application to all persons whose rights may be effected thereby and 
shall give them an opportunity to be heard before authorizing the 
change. Such notice may be given by regular mail five days before 
the hearing or by one publication in a newspaper of general circulation 
in the county in which the original point of diversion or place of use 
is located five days before such hearing. Before making an investiga-
tion or giving notice the state engineer may require the applicant to 
deposit a sum of money sufficient to pay the expenses thereof. 
Applications for either permanent or temporary changes shall not 
be rejected for the sole reason that such change would impair vested 
rights of others, but if otherwise proper, they may be approved as to 
part of the water involved or upon condition that such conflicting rights 
be acquired. 
Any person holding an approved application for the appropriation of 
water may in like manner, either permanently or temporarily, change 
the point of diversion, place or purpose of use, but no such change 
of approved application shall affect the priority of the original appli-
cation; provided, that no change of point of diversion, place or nature 
of use set forth in an approved application shall operate to enlarge 
the time within which the construction of work shall begin or be com-
pleted. The determination of the state engineer shall be final, unless 
an action to review his decision is filed within the time and in the man-
ner provided by section IOC—3-14. 
Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of diver-
sion, place or purpose of use, either permanently or temporarily with-
out first applying to the state engineer in the manner herein provided, 
shall obtain no right thereby and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, 
each day of such unlawful change constituting a. separate offense, 
separately punishable. (L. 19, p. 177, § £.) 
History. 
As amended bv L. 37, ch. 130, e£. 
l iar. 19; L.H 32, ~eh. 111, e£. Mar. 20, 
Tev^riring t e n Gf enure section. 
This seen on was Genu. Laws 1907, 
§ 12Bsx24; E. E. 1E9£, § 1253. 
1. Change of p'&ce of diversion. 
.mor appropriates conic make change 
in place of diversion and nse of water 
which neitner enlargec nor diminished 
SUT <m«rrrng right bnt merely made use 
cf «*?*<ir:r*g» right at another place, with-
out detriment or rmnairment of any 
Tested right of itziior annronriator. 
I^hmim v.. Utah Gorier CcL, 11B F.2d 
51L 
~nere ccmcration distributee ^ water 
to its shareholders br means of ditches, 
transfer cf water to shareholders from 
one ditch to another, held, not change 
of plan* cf diversion. Arnold v. .crnv 
inrton Cm?1 £ P-eservoir Ass^, 64 u. 
S34. 231 P. v*** 
2. _ Change of use. 
In a case decided prior to 1919, it was 
held that a landowner conic1 not appro-
priate water irom a d:tch for one*pnr-
nose and then apply it or any part of 
it to another pnmose. Bag- Cottonwood 
Tanner Ditch Co. T. Shnrtiifl, 49 U. 
569, 164 ?. £56. 
3. Extent of right. 
Prior appropriates right to change 
the place of diversion is not absolute 
or vested right, bnt is only conditional, 
since no snch change can be made if 
pnblic, or any other appropriator, prior 
or strbsecnent, is adversely afiected, and 
neither can a prior appropriator prevent 
a snbsecnent appropriator from nsing 
any cf the rnapprcpnated waters of the 
state to the rullest extent possible 
merely becanse prior appropriator in 
fnrzre may desire to change his niace 
of diversion. "Dnited States T. Calcwell, 
